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ABSTRACT 
The concept of fairness is essential to the administration of justice. The right to a fair 
trial embodies this notion of fairness and informs the development of almost every 
aspect of law. This is most clearly visible in the criminal process.  
However, the practical application of the right to a fair trial raises a number of issues. 
In part, its presence in almost every area of law means that the right is composed by 
a number of other rights. Further, because the concept of fairness is not static, the 
right to a fair trial has an ever changing scope, content and meaning. These 
considerations have resulted in the absence of clear principles guiding the application 
of the right in the everyday administration of justice. 
If left unattended, there is real risk that this lack of guidance may eventually dilute 
the substance of the right to a fair trial. As a consequence of its fundamental nature, a 
weakening of the right brings implications for the continued public confidence in the 
administration of justice.  
This paper will contend that the application of the right to a fair trial should be 
directed toward the goals of the criminal process. This means that the right to a fair 
trial should protect the rights of the defendant to promote the legitimacy of the 
verdict. Fundamentally however, the right to a fair trial means the right that all 
persons have to a factually accurate verdict.  The continued significance of the right 
to a fair trial therefore requires the formation and application of the law to be 
directed toward the goal of factually accuracy in the verdict and also, to reach such a 
verdict in a way that is fair to all parties.  
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
II THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL- CHARACTERISTICS AND EXPRESSIONS ............................... 7 
 An Outline .................................................................................................................... 7 A
1 Right to a fair trial not confined to the criminal law ............................................... 7 
2 The fair trial extends throughout the trial process .................................................. 8 
3 The right to a fair trial is right to all parties ........................................................... 9 
4 Right to a fair trial is composed of a number of rights .......................................... 10 
5 Right to a fair trial as an evolving principle .......................................................... 12 
 The Common Law Right to a Fair Trial .................................................................... 14 B
1 Overview ................................................................................................................ 14 
2 The right to a fair trial as a rule of statutory interpretation .................................. 15 
3 Abuse of process and the right to a fair trial ......................................................... 24 
4 The rules of evidence and the right to a fair trial .................................................. 27 
5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 30 
III HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL .......................................................... 32 
 Objectives of the criminal process – protection of rights and the legitimacy of the A
verdict ....................................................................................................................... 32 
 Human Rights and the Fair Trial- An Overview........................................................ 34 B
1 Varying approaches to the right to a fair trial....................................................... 34 
2 Basis of enforcement .............................................................................................. 36 
 The Charter, the HRA, the HRA UK and the Right to a Fair Trial ........................... 37 C
1 An Outline .............................................................................................................. 37 
2 Interpretation ......................................................................................................... 38 
3 The United Kingdom approach .............................................................................. 39 
4 The Australian approach - Momcilovic v The Queen ............................................ 40 
5 The limits of the ‘dialogue model’ of rights protection in Australia...................... 42 
 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 44 D
IV CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................ 45 
 The Separation of Powers and Chapter III ................................................................ 47 A
1 Overview ................................................................................................................ 47 
2 Constitutional framework ...................................................................................... 48 
3 Separation of judicial power and the fair trial ...................................................... 49 
4 Dietrich v The Queen ............................................................................................. 51 
 The Kable Principle, the expansion of judicial power and the right to a fair trial ... 53 B
vi 
 
 The ‘constitutional right to a fair trial’? ................................................................... 56 C
1 Right to examine witnesses not constitutionally protected .................................... 56 
2 The inadmissibility of fresh evidence on appeal- limiting the right to a fair trial . 58 
 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 61 D
V THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS ............................................................................................................................ 63 
 Objectives of the Criminal Process- Factual Accuracy of the Verdict ...................... 63 A
 Scientific research as informing the fair trial ............................................................ 66 B
1 Dupas v The Queen ................................................................................................ 67 
2 State v Henderson .................................................................................................. 69 
 Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials- An Overview .................................................... 71 C
1 Admissibility of expert evidence............................................................................. 71 
2 Admissibility and reliability ................................................................................... 73 
 Admissibility of expert testimony and the goal of factual accuracy........................... 76 D
1 Exclusionary approach in relation to expert eyewitness evidence ........................ 77 
2 Inclusionary Approach in relation to unreliable expert testimony ........................ 80 
 Limited Effectiveness of Fair Trial Safeguards ......................................................... 85 E
1 Cross examination, rebuttal witnesses and other adversarial safeguards ............ 85 
 Right to a Fair Trial- The admissibility of expert evidence and the goals of the F
criminal process ........................................................................................................ 89 
 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 91 G
VI THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA- CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS ................ 93 
 
 
1 
 
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL- A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
ROSHAN SINGH CHOPRA 
I INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental and overarching right to a fair trial resonates strongly in the 
contemporary criminal justice system. The High Court of Australia has emphasised 
the significance of the right as being ‘the central thesis of the administration of 
criminal justice’1 and ‘the central prescript of our criminal law’2. The right to a fair 
trial is by no means a recent development.  It has been observed that the right to due 
process of law can be traced back to the Magna Carta in 1225.
3
 Indeed in 1923 
Issacs J wrote that the right to a fair trial was ‘so elementary as to need no authority 
to support it’.4  
The right to a fair trial at common law is primarily grounded in the inherent power of 
the court to stay a trial for an abuse of process. This, as Sir Anthony Mason observes, 
represents ‘the most significant development of the fair trial’.5 The right is also 
personified in other ways which, broadly, include ‘rules of law and practise designed 
to regulate the course of the trial’.6  The concept of fairness permeates almost every 
aspect of criminal law.
7
 This is apparent in the rules of evidence. For instance, in the 
                                                          
1
 McKinney v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468,478 (Mason CJ, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
2
 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23, 56 (Deane J). 
3
 William Sharp McKenchine, Magna Carta: A Commentary on The Great Charter of King John 
(James Maclehose & Sons, 1914) 376; Article 29 of the Magna Carta provides ‘To no man we will 
sell, to no man will we deny or delay justice or right’. Indeed, the Magna Carta is ‘the groundwork for 
all constitutions’ Ex Parte Walsh and Johnson (1925) 37 CLR 36, 79 (Issacs J). It represents the 
conceptual foundation of contemporary human rights. See Lord Derry Irvine, ‘The Spirit of Magna 
Carta Continues to Resonate in Modern Law’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 227, 234. It has been 
acknowledged that this is the ancestor of the right to a fair trial as expressed numerous international 
human rights instruments and constitutions. See Richard Vogler, ‘Due Process’ in  Michael Rosenfeld 
and Andras Sajo (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 930-8.  
4
 R v Macfarlane; Ex parte O’ Flanagan and O’ Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 518, 541-2. 
5
 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Fair Trial’ (1995) 19 Criminal Law Review 7, 11. 
6
 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23, 29 (Mason CJ) citing Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 
CLR 54. 
7
 James Spiegelman, ‘The truth can cost too much: The Principle of a fair trial’ (2004) 78 Australian 
Law Journal 29, 36. 
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seminal case of R v Christie,
8
 Moulton LJ held that the discretion to exclude 
evidence which is more prejudicial than probative ‘is based on an anxiety to secure 
for everyone a fair trial’.9 The concept of fairness allows procedures to be flexible 
and evolve in line with society’s conceptions of justice.10   
In addition to being entrenched in the common law, the right has found exposition in 
most major human rights instruments and bills of rights. The right is embodied most 
prominently in article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 
14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘the ICCPR’).11 It 
is also expressed in article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the 
ECHR’).12  Key aspects of the right are also present in several other United Nations 
human rights instruments.
13
 The right to a fair trial is clearly part of the body of 
customary international law and informs human rights norms.
14
 
The right is also expressed in the Bill of Rights of the United States,
15
 Canada,
16
 the 
United Kingdom,
17
 and New Zealand.
18
  In the United States, the Supreme Court has 
                                                          
8
 R v Christie [1914] AC 545. 
9
 R v Christie [1914] AC 545, 599; See also Pfenning v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461, 490-513 
(McHugh J).    
10
 Spiegelman, ‘The truth can cost too much’, above n 7, 43; See also Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 
184 CLR 19, 82-90 Where Gaudron J observes that ‘notions of justice and injustice…must reflect 
contemporary values’.   
11
International Convention of Civil and Political Rights opened for signature 16 December 1966,    
[1980] ATS 23 (entered into force 13 November 1980) (‘ICCPR’). 
12
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 ( entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocols No. 
11 and 14. (‘ECHR’). 
13
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4  
(entered into force 16 January 1991) art 40; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965 [1975] ATS 40 (entered into force 
7 March 1966) art 5(a); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment  or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984 [1989] ATS 21 (entered into force 
26 June 1987)  art 15; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 
March 2007, [2008] ATS 12 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 13 citied in Sangeeta Shah,’ 
Administration of Justice’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandeh Sivakumaran (eds) 
International Human Rights Law ( Oxford University Press, 2010) 315-6 
14
 Shah, above n 13, 316-7; Bahma Sivasubramaniam, The Right of an Accused to a Fair Trial:  
Independence of the Impartiality of the International Criminal Courts (PhD Thesis, Durham 
University, 2013) 16-35 < http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6982/> for a succinct overview of the right to a fair 
trial in the various international human rights treaties. 
15
 See United States v. Agurs 472 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) with respect to United States Constitution 
amend V; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) regarding United States Constitution amend XIV 
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held that the United States Constitution provides all accused a right to a fair trial 
which ‘must be maintained at all costs’.19  The right is constitutionally protected in 
South Africa as an ‘overriding requirement to which all the rules of evidence in 
criminal trials will have to conform’.20  In Malaysia, it has been held that articles 5(1) 
and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia make certain ‘that a fair and just 
punishment is imposed according to the facts of the case’.21   The right also finds 
expression in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1997 which is based on the 
ICCPR.
22
  Further, the right is evident in jurisdictions outside the common law such 
as Germany,
23
 and Japan.
24
 In Australia, the right is a fundamental common law right 
and statutorily embodied in the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (‘the HRA’) and the 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) (‘the Charter’). 25  
This list is by no means exhaustive. The entrenchment of the right to a fair trial in a 
multitude of constitutions and human rights instruments signifies its fundamental and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
citied in Sanjay Chhabiani, ‘Disentangling the Sixth Amendment’ (2008) 11 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 487. 
16
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms art 11(d). 
17
 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 (1) the right is incorporated into the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 1. 
18
 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 25(a). 
19
 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (Clark J) (1965); United States Constitution amend V. 
20
 Matthew Chaskalson et al , Constitutional Law of South Africa Revision Service 5 1999 Juta & Co   
Ltd, 26-7citing Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 s 35(3);  The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 ss 33, 34, makes clear that the right applies equally in civil and 
administrative proceedings. 
21
 Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261,290A (Gopal Sri Ram 
JCA) cited in Thio Li-Ann, A Treatise On Singapore Constitutional Law (Academy Publishing, 2012) 
671-2.  
22
 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 383, art 10; The appellate courts in Hong 
Kong have adopted a holistic approach to the concept of ‘fairness’ in judicial review of legislation. In 
Hong Kong, aggrieved persons may seek judicial review not only on the grounds of procedural 
fairness but also on pragmatic aspects of decision making which include, for example, the design of 
questionaries. See Sakthavel Prabakar v. Secretary for Security [2005] 1 HKLRD 289; See generally, 
Swati Jhaveri, Transforming “fairness” as a ground of judicial review in Hong Kong (2013) 11 (2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 358. 
23
 Grundgestz fur die Bundesrepublik Deuchland [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
1949] art 103. 
24
  The Constitution of Japan 1947 (Japan) art 31.  
25
  Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) ss 21, 22; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(VIC) ss 24, 25. 
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universal nature.
26
  As Baroness Hale has observed, these instruments ‘place some 
limits upon what a democratically elected parliament may do… Democracy is the 
will of the people, but the people may not will to invade the rights and freedoms 
which are fundamental to democracy itself.’27 And in this light, the right to a fair trial 
is a key constitutional right ‘intrinsic to the idea of the rule of law’.28 
The right is thus one which is ‘fundamental and absolute’.29 However, its application 
requires a balance between competing considerations.
30
 As Deane J observes, notions 
of fairness defy ‘analytical definition’.31 Indeed what is fair or otherwise in the 
individual case must be determined by the court in the exercise of its discretion. 
It is arguable that despite its judicial emphasis, determinations as to the application 
of the right to a fair trial have not been drawn with much certainty.
32
  Indeed, often 
only the ‘minimum requirements’ of the right are expressed.33  In part, the right’s 
status as a fundamental common law right makes determinations as to its content and 
scope elusive. Common law rights have customarily operated as ‘broad 
                                                          
26
 See generally, David Harris, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings as a Human Right’ 
(1967) 16 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 352; M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in 
the context of criminal justice: Identifying international procedural protections and equivalent 
protections in national constitutions’ (1993) 3 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 235, 
267 where the author notes that aside from international treaties, the right is embodied in thirty eight 
national constitutions. 
27
 R v (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52, [113] citied in Rabinder Singh, 
Interpreting Bills of Rights (2008) 29 (2) Statute Law Review 82, 83. 
28
 TRS Allan, ‘Review of Richard Bellamy, “Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy’ (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal 423,425; The rule of law and the 
right to a fair trial share a number of characteristics. For example an independent and impartial 
judiciary is both a feature of the rule of law and the fair trial See Augusto Zimmermann,  The Rule of 
Law as a Culture of Legality: Legal and Extra –legal Elements for the Realisation of the Rule of Law 
in Society (2007) 14 (1) eLaw Journal : Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 10, 17-23 < 
http://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/issues/2007/1/eLaw_rule_law_culture_legality.pdf>.  
29
  Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 719 (Lord Styen). 
30
 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23,33 (Mason CJ) 
31
 Ibid 57. 
32
 Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1,  152 [382], 172[409] (Heydon J) 
33
 See Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 25(2); Human Rights Act 2004 
(ACT) s 22(2).   
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aspirations’.34 As such they ‘were conceptions of generally desirable outcomes, not a 
tool for defining a baseline of acceptable law and conduct for government’.35 
Such ambiguity has led some to express serious concerns about the future of the 
right. For example, Langford observes that the fair trial ‘is like rugby, the boy’s 
scouts, and television, simply a diffused cultural trait’.36 It has also been argued that 
society’s interest in bringing accused persons to trial often trumps their right to a fair 
trial.
37
 These issues are compounded by the continuously evolving meaning of the 
right.
38
  
There is a real risk that in the absence of clear principles guiding its application, the 
continued significance of the right in shaping the administration of justice may be 
diminished.
39
 Indeed these issues have, arguably, already diluted the influence right 
so as to render it ‘an obscure and weak entitlement’.40 
This paper contends that core aspects of the right to a fair trial enjoy substantial 
protection in the Australian legal landscape. However, it argues that the right to a fair 
trial is not protected in the full sense of the term.  It submits that the continued 
significance of the right to a fair trial requires its judicial and legislative application 
to be directed to the goals of the criminal process. That is, ‘to accurately determine 
whether or not a person has committed a crime and to do so fairly’.41 
First, an overview of the broad characteristics of the right to a fair trial will be 
provided by this paper. The rest of this analysis builds, in large part, on these 
                                                          
34
 Paul Rishworth, ‘Common Law Rights and Navigation Lights: Judicial Review and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights’ (2004) 15 Public Law Review103, 106. 
35
 Ibid106. 
36
 Ian Langford, ‘Fair Trial: the history on an idea’ (2009) 8(1) Journal of Human Rights 37, 51. 
37
 Mirko Bagaric, Theo Alexander and Marlene Ebejer, ‘The illusion that is the right to a fair trial in 
Australia’ (2011) 17 (2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 59, 65. 
38
 See generally Langford, above n 36. 
39
 Bagaric, Alexander and Ebejer, above n 37, 62. 
40
 Ibid 81. 
41
 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford University Press, 3
rd
 ed, 
2005) 22. 
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interrelated characteristics of the right. Thereafter, the principle manifestations of the 
right at common law will be illustrated. It will be argued that while the courts have 
the power to ensure a fair trial, the right remains vulnerable to statutory abrogation in 
certain circumstances.  
The goals of the criminal trial will then be introduced. It will be argued the criminal 
trial is concerned with protecting rights. This leads to the issue of the extent to which 
the right is protected from legislative inroads. This analysis will involve testing the 
strength of the fair trial protections under the statutory bills of rights in Victoria and 
the Australian Capital Territory.  It will be argued that these instruments do not 
substantially protect the right in relation to remedying legislation which detracts from 
the right to a fair trial. The discussion will then turn to the constitutional issues 
surrounding the right. It will be argued that any Chapter III implication of the right is 
limited and the right is not constitutionally protected in the full sense of the term. 
Finally, it will be argued that another fundamental goal of the criminal trial is a 
factually accurate verdict. In this light, the practical operation of the right will be 
considered using the example of the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal 
trials. It will be seen that public confidence in the administration of justice is 
contingent on the application of fair trial rights directed to the goals of the criminal 
process. This involves protecting the rights of the accused and, fundamentally, 
ensuring a factually accurate verdict. 
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II  THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL- CHARACTERISTICS AND EXPRESSIONS 
 An Outline A
As the right to a fair trial is present in almost all areas of law and informs numerous 
practices and procedures, it is not feasible to attempt to describe all the ways in 
which the right manifests itself. However, it is useful to conceive of the right as 
containing a number of key characteristics. 
  Right to a fair trial not confined to the criminal law 1
The first characteristic is that although the right is most vividly demonstrated in 
criminal law, the right is similarly applicable in civil proceedings. The right is part of 
the body of core principles inherent to both the criminal and civil areas of law.
42
  For 
instance, fair trial principles in the civil sphere are illustrated in the obligation to 
discover all relevant documents.
43
 However, its application in the civil areas of law 
differs from its application in criminal law.
44
 It has been argued that the discretion to 
exclude evidence which is more prejudicial than probative operates in its full sense in 
criminal trials.
45
 As most civil matters are heard by a single judge, it would be 
artificial if the judge would consider the evidence and then exclude it as the finder of 
fact.
46
 Also, in general, issues of expediency and efficiency weigh more heavily in 
the civil sphere.
47
 Such differences aside, it may be said that in both civil and 
criminal law the ‘court’s procedure is there for the sole purpose of seeing that there is 
                                                          
42
 Tomas Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books, 2010), 90.  
43
 Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (Lawbook, 9th ed, 2011) 355. 
44
 Spigelman, ‘The truth can cost too much’, above n 7, 30. 
45
 JR Forbes, ‘Extent of the Judicial Discretion to Reject Prejudicial Evidence in Civil Cases’ (1988) 
62 Australian Law Journal 211, 213-4. 
46
 Ibid 214; Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ‘Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding’ (2005) 153 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1251. 
47
 See especially  Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd  v Australian National University  (2009)  239 CLR 
175; Dorne Boniface and Michael Legg, ‘Cost, Delay and Justice: The High Court of Australia 
Recognizes the Importance of Case Management in Civil Litigation- Aon Risk Services Australia 
Limited v Australian National University’ (2010) 39 (2) Common Law World Review 157;  See 
generally Tania Sourdin and Naomi Burstyner, ‘Cost and time hurdles in civil litigation: Exploring the 
impact of pre-action requirement’ (2013) 2 Journal of Civil Litigation and Practice 66. 
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a fair trial of each and every set of proceedings’.48  However, this paper will focus on 
the criminal process given the consequences of a verdict in a criminal trial is likely to 
impinge upon individual freedoms and liberties. 
 The fair trial extends throughout the trial process 2
Secondly, the trial represents but one step in the entire criminal process. The right 
cannot be confined to the trial and must operate throughout the criminal process from 
investigation to sentencing.
49
  The importance of this was illustrated in the well-
known case of Mallard v The Queen where police impropriety during the 
investigation caused Mallard to be wrongly convicted of murder.
50
 Ultimately, 
Kirby J invoked the right to a fair trial in holding that, because material evidence was 
not disclosed to Mallard; his trial was unfair and a miscarriage of justice resulted.
51
 
Other cases of police and forensic impropriety have proven that unfair and 
inappropriate practices during the investigative stage can infect the whole trial and 
lead to wrongful convictions.
52
 In addition to increasing the possibility of 
miscarriages of justice, a corruption of process at an early stage may impugn the 
‘moral validity’ of the verdict.53 Consequently, public confidence in the 
administration of justice requires that authorities observe the requirement of fairness 
                                                          
48
 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15, 18 (YoungJ). 
49
 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23, 29 (Mason CJ), 47 (Brennan J); T.R.S Allan, 
Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2001), 272  
50
  Mallard v The Queen  (2005) 224 CLR 125; See generally, Report on the Inquiry into Alleges 
Misconduct by Public Officers in Connection with the Investigation of the Murder of Mrs Pamela 
Lawrence , the Prosecution and Appeals of Mr Andrew Mark Mallard and Other Related Matters 
(Perth: Corruption and Crime Commission, 2008) 
51
 Mallard v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125, 156-7; For an overview of prosecution disclosure in 
various common law jurisdictions see Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] SGCA 32 
(26 August 2011), [77]-[99] (VK Rajah JA). 
52
 See, eg, R v Jama [2009] VSCA (7 December 2009) Mr Jama was wrongfully convicted of rape on 
the basis of a matching DNA profile; See generally Victoria, Inquiry into the circumstances that led to 
conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama, Report (2010); Jeremy Gans, ‘Ozymandias On Trial: 
Wrongs and Rights in DNA Cases’ in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter (eds), Criminal Evidence and 
Human Rights: Reimaging Common Law Procedural Traditions (Oxford and Portland, 2012) 195, 
208-13.  
53
 Allan, Constitutional Justice, above n 49, 272. 
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in all stages of the criminal process.
54
  Therefore, the court has a broad power to stay 
a trial for an abuse of its processes to preserve the integrity of the trial and safety of 
the verdict.
55
  Indeed, in many respects, the right to a fair trial has been embedded in 
legislation. Examples of this include the requirement that confessions be recorded. 
56
  
  The right to a fair trial is right to all parties  3
Third, the right to a fair trial does not apply only to the accused. It applies to all 
actors in the adjudicative process.
57
 The criminal trial involves ‘a triangulation of 
interests’ between the accused, the victim and society.58 Therefore, the fair trial 
requires a balance between the interests of the accused and those of society in 
deciding the guilt or innocence of persons charged with a crime.
59
 These competing 
interests underpin the adversarial nature of the criminal trial.
60
 As Barwick CJ has 
observed it is ‘a trial in which the protagonists are the Crown on the one hand and the 
                                                          
54
   Antoun v The Queen (2006) 159 A Crim R 513, 521-22 [28] (Kirby J); X7 v Australian Crime 
Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, 612-3 Justice Kiefel  has noted that ‘[t]he accusatorial nature of the 
system of criminal justice involves not only the trial itself , but also pretrial inquiries and 
investigations’: at [160] 
55
  Moti v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 456, 479; Police (SA) v Sherlock (2009) 103 SASR 147, 173 
(Korakis J) 
56
 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23V; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 118; Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 281; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 74C-G; Crimes Act 1958 
(Vic) s 464H; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) s142; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 
2000 (Qld) ss 436-9.   
57
  See Jeremy Gans, Evidence law under Victoria’s Charter: Rights and goals (Pt1) (2008) 19 Public 
Law Review 197, 200-1; Human Rights Act 2004 ACT s 21 (1) ‘Everyone has the right to have 
criminal charges, and rights and obligations recognised by law, decided by a competent, independent 
and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing.’ (emphasis added). 
58
  Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999) [2001] 2 AC 91, 118 (Lord Steyn); See McKinney v 
The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468, 488. Justice Dawson  notes that; ‘[n]o one would deny that an 
accused is entitled to a fair trial, but a fair trial is one which is fair to both sides’  
59
  Police (SA) v Sherlock (2009) 103 SASR 147,159,165 (Doyle CJ); Jago v District Court (NSW) 
(1989) 168 CLR 23, 33 (Mason CJ). 
60
  But see Mark Findlay Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (Oxford 
University Press, 4
th
 ed, 2009) 166 where it is noted that ‘the adversary model should not be regarded 
as sacrosanct’. The authors note that it would serve the end of justice if the judge were to call 
witnesses who could then be cross examined by both parties ; John Faulks , ‘A Natural Selection? The 
Potential and Possibility for the Development of Less Adversarial Trials by Reference to the 
Experience of the Family Court of Australia’ (2010) 35 University of Western Australia Law Review 
185. 
10 
 
accused on the other’.61 As such, the trial must be fair to both the prosecution, as well 
as the accused.
62
 
The right to a fair trial must also be balanced against the interests of society in the 
allocation of limited resources. This is pertinent in light of recent funding cuts to 
courts in some Australian jurisdictions.
63
 Indeed Brennan J has noted that courts can 
only conduct ‘as fair a trial as practicable’ in light of finite resources.64 The tension 
between limited resources and the fair trial is best expressed by White J who 
observes, that ‘[d]ue process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at 
whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person’.65 
 Right to a fair trial is composed of a number of rights 4
The fourth characteristic is that the right to a fair trial is composed of a number of 
rights. While the exact scope of these rights remains elusive, international 
instruments such as the ICCPR express some of the elements of the right.
66
  
According to King J, the right to a fair trial as provided in s 24 of the Charter 
‘already exists at common law’ and the provisions in s 25 forms ‘the basis of what 
                                                          
61
  Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510, 517 cited in X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 
298 ALR 570, 598 (Hayne and Bell JJ). 
62
  See  Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 335 Justice Deane has held that ‘[i]n determining 
the practical content  of the requirement that a criminal trial be fair regard must be had to the interests 
of the crown acting on behalf on the community as well as to the interests of the accused’  
63
  See, eg, Sean Fewster,’ SA Chief Justice Chris Kourakis says retiring judges will not be replaced 
due to funding cuts’ The Advertiser (online) 25 June 2013 
<http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/sa-chief-justice-chris-kourakis-says-retiring-
judges-will-not-be-replaced-due-to-funding-cuts/story-e6frea83-1226669629349> where  Kourakis CJ 
of the Supreme Court of South Australia expressed dissatisfaction on funding cuts to courts. His 
Honour noted , among other things, that due to funding cuts , cases may take longer which may 
discourage guilty pleas as any ‘judgment or trial date is way beyond the horizon’; Similar concerns 
have been expressed in Western Australia by Martin CJ. See Chief Justice Wayne Martin, (Media 
Statement, 28 August 2013) where his Honour notes that due to lack of funding, ‘there will be a 
continuing reduction in the standard of service provided by the Supreme Court’; This issue is also 
present in the United States. In a letter to Vice President (as President of the US Senate) Hon. Joseph 
R. Biden, the Chief Justices of 87 Federal District Courts noted ‘we believe that our constitutional 
duties, public safety, and the quality of the justice system will be profoundly compromised by any 
further cuts’ The Third Branch News, 87 U.S. Chief Judges Appeal to Congress for Funding Help (15 
August 2013) United States Courts < http://news.uscourts.gov/87-us-chief-judges-appeal-congress-
funding-help>. 
64
  Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292,325.  
65
  Patterson v New York 432 US 197, 208 (1977).  
66
  Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 300 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
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constitutes a fair hearing’.67 Application of these rights is largely based on a ‘check 
list’ approach where the conduct of the trial is held up against a list of rights to 
ascertain whether any of these rights have been infringed.
68
 However, there are core 
elements of the right to a fair trial without which the right cannot exist. The most 
fundamental element of the right is an independent and impartial judiciary.
69
  This 
point is evident in the implication of the right to a fair trial from Chapter III of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12 , s 9 
(‘the Constitution’).70  
It is important to note that while there are certain core elements of the right, the 
content of these elements will wax and wane according to the case at hand and the 
prevailing social climate.
71
  An example of this can be illustrated within the rubric of 
the privilege against self-incrimination which is another key element of the right to a 
fair trial.
72
 This ground of privilege is a ‘fundamental bulwark of liberty’.73 
Parliament has however, limited this right in certain contexts. An example is s 68 of 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) which 
abolishes the right against self-incrimination although the statements of the person 
examined cannot be admitted into evidence.
74
 More recently, the New South Wales 
                                                          
67
 R v Williams [2007] VSC 2 (15 January 2007) [54-6]; See also Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 
CLR 1, 51. 
68
 Langford, above n 36, 48. 
69
 Spigelman, ‘The truth can cost too much’, above n 7, 34. 
70
 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326-9. 
71
 See Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 353 (Toohey J). 
72
 The right is expressed in United States Constitution amend V; ICCPR art 14; Charter of Human 
Rights and responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 25 (2)(k); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 22(2) (h)(i). 
73
 Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328, 340; See X7 v Australian 
Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, 599 [102-04] ( Hayne and Bell JJ) Their Honours go on to 
illustrate the nature of the accusatorial process and the fundamental role which this privilege plays 
within the criminal justice framework; at 602-4 [116-126]; See JD Heydon, Cross on Evidence 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 9
th
 Australian Edition, 2013) 808-9 [25120]. 
74
 See RP Austin and IM Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
15
th
 ed, 2013) 77- 82[3.170] for an overview of the investigative powers of ASIC. See also 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 155. 
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Parliament has limited the right to silence in criminal proceedings.
75
 In this vein, 
Gleeson CJ has warned against presupposing the presence of an inherent ‘principle 
of fairness’ in the law which only a judge can reveal in the individual case.76  A 
doctrine of law may operate more strictly in some cases than in others and fairness in 
the specific case is only one factor to which the law reacts.
77
 
 Right to a fair trial as an evolving principle  5
Related to this is the fifth and perhaps most significant aspect of the right. That is, 
the right is one which is ‘not written in stone for all time’ and will correspond to the 
prevailing social attitudes to justice.
78
 The concept of fairness is not static and 
responds to changes in the social climate which is in turn reflected in criminal law 
and procedure.
79
  Indeed the contemporary criminal justice system is the result of an 
organic development of laws and practices and not that of ‘some single organising 
theory about the administration of justice’.80  
As illustration of this would be the way in which the independence of the judicial 
process, a core element of the right, corresponds to changes such as the prevalence of 
social media and the internet. In the United Kingdom, the case of Attorney General v 
Frail brought this issue to prominence where it was held that the inappropriate use of 
social media by jurors may impugn ‘long established principles which underpin the 
                                                          
75
Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Act 2013 (NSW) s 89A;Criminal Procedure Amendment 
(Mandatory Pre-trial Defence Disclosure) Act 2013; In WA, the right to silence is firmly entrenched 
in the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 8 (1), 11.  
76
 Murray Gleeson ‘Individualised Justice – The Holy Grail’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 421, 
432. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Sir Anthony Mason, above n 5, 7. 
79
 Bingham, above n 42, 91; R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24, 42 (Martin J); Dietrich v The Queen 
(1992) 177 CLR 292, 364 Justice Gaudron has noted that ‘notions of fairness are inevitably bound up 
with prevailing social values’. 
80
  X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, 604 [123] (Hayne and Bell JJ); See also 
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292,319 (Brennan J) ‘Where a common law rule requires some 
expansion or modification in order to operate more fairly or efficiently, this Court will modify the rule 
provided no injustice is done thereby’. 
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right of every citizen to a fair trial’.81 Perhaps a recent case in the United States 
where a juror updated her Facebook status to announce that ‘it’s gonna be fun to tell 
the defendant they’re guilty: P’ after the first day of the trial best illustrates the need 
for procedures to adapt to preserve the fairness of the trial.
82
 Such issues are not 
confined to the jury as judges also use social media.
83
 These concerns strike at the 
heart of the fair trial as it can frustrate the ability of the prosecution or defence to 
respond to all the evidence available to the jury in making their decision.
84
  
Chief Justice Spigelman has pointed out that the internet has presented challenges to 
procedures which previously served to shield jurors from prejudicial information.
85
  
However, the right to a fair trial is composed of, and is secured by, a framework of 
laws and procedures which evolved through pragmatic experience.
86
 The advent of 
the internet and social media represent only the latest problem which requires a 
practical reworking of the relevant law and procedure.
87
 The point was best 
expressed by Lord Bingham who said: 
                                                          
81
 Attorney General v Fraill [2011] EWCA Crim 1570 (June 14 2011) [29] (Lord Judge). 
82
 Neil M, ‘Oops. Juror Calls Defendant Guilty on Facebook, Before Verdict’, ABA Journal (2 
September 2011) 
<http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oops._juror_calls_defendant_guilty_on_facebook_though_v
erdict_isnt_in> citied in Lorana Bartels and Jessica Lee, ‘Jurors using social media in our courts: 
Challenges and responses’ (2013) 23 Journal of Judicial Administration 35, 39; See Generally 
Marilyn Krawitz, ‘Guilty As Tweeted: Jurors Using Social Media Inappropriately During the Trial 
Process’ (Research Paper No 2012-02, University of Western Australia, 2012).  
83
 See, Marilyn Krawitz, ‘Can Australian judges keep their “friends” close and their ethical obligations 
closer? An analysis regarding Australian judges use of social media’ (2013) 23 Journal of Judicial   
Administration 14. 
84
 R. v Karakaya [2005] Cr App R 5, 82 (Lord Justice Judge); See also Issac Frawley Buckley, ‘Pre-
Trial publicity, social media and the “fair trial”: Protecting impartiality in the Queensland criminal 
justice system’ (2013) 33 Queensland Lawyer 38, 42-9.   
85
 James J Spigelman, ‘The internet and the right to a fair trial’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 331,  
333. 
86
 Ibid 335. 
87
 Ibid; See also Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future (Oxford  
University Press, 2013) 102-4. Where it is argued that the judicial process must adhere to fair trial 
principles even in light of technological advancements which have the potential to alter the trial 
process. 
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A time is unlikely to come when anyone will ever be able to say that perfect fairness 
has been achieved once and for all, and in retrospect most legal systems operating 
today will be judged to be defective in respects not yet recognized 
88
 
 The Common Law Right to a Fair Trial B
 Overview 1
The broad characteristics of the right being established, it is now necessary to 
elucidate the right at common law. At common law, it has been observed that the 
right best conveyed in ‘negative terms as a right not to be tried unfairly…for no 
person can enforce a right to be tried by the State’ although it is not ‘unduly 
misleading’ to refer to the right in positive terms. 89 
Elucidation of the common law right to a fair trial is pertinent as; first, the right to a 
fair trial is a fundamental common law right. Second, as will be examined below, the 
Charter and the HRA do not significantly add to the protection the right enjoys at 
common law.  Further, the implication of the right to a fair trial in the Constitution 
by Deane and Gaudron JJ in Dietrich build on the right to a fair trial as a 
fundamental common law right.
90
 
It is possible to unpack the common law conception of the right into three distinct but 
interrelated expressions. First, the right informs the interpretation of legislation 
through the principle of legality. Second, the common law right to a fair trial 
manifests itself in the power of the court to stay a trial for an abuse of its processes. 
Finally, the right to a fair trial guides the formation of the law. As noted above, this 
is most pronounced in the rules of evidence.  The common law right to a fair trial is 
                                                          
88
 Bingham, above n 42, 91 
89
  Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 299 (Mason CJ and McHugh J); Cf R v DA [2008] 
ACTSC 26 (31 March 2008) [7]-[8] (Higgins CJ). 
90
  Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials ( Federation Press, 5
th
 ed, 2010) 701 
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largely a result of the interplay between these three broad concepts. This being said, 
as it arises in an infinite variety of contexts, it is impossible to exhaustively describe 
all the aspects of the right.
91
 As such, a number of considerations remain beyond the 
scope of this paper.
92
  
  The right to a fair trial as a rule of statutory interpretation 2
The significance of the law of statutory interpretation cannot be understated. Chief 
Justice Spigelman notes that it has ‘become the most important single aspect of legal 
practice’.93 The law of statutory interpretation is of such critical importance as it is 
how the common law has traditionally protected rights.
94
  It is a basic principle of 
statutory interpretation that the court is to interpret the words used by parliament.
95
  
Accordingly, as parliament is assumed to legislate to uphold rights, courts must 
approach questions of statutory construction on this premise.
96
  
(a) The principle of legality 
The ‘principle of legality’97 refers to the presumption that where ambiguity in a 
statute exists, the statute will not be interpreted so as to restrict fundamental common 
                                                          
91
 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 300 (Mason CJ, McHugh J), 353 (Toohey J); 
Spigelman, ‘The truth can cost too much’, above n 7, 33.   
92
  See Jeremy Gans, Criminal Process and Human Rights (Federation Press, 2011) 382-9; The right 
to a fair trial is linked to the notion of ‘miscarriages of justice’ as expressed in appeal statutes. This is 
because the court, on appeal, will have to determine whether the trial of the accused was fair in the 
sense that ‘no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred’ See, eg, Criminal Appeals Act 
2004 (WA) ss 14(2), 30 (4); Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300; The right also manifests itself it 
the power of the court to punish a contempt of court. See X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 
298 ALR 570, 583-4 [38] (French CJ and Crennan J); Hammond v Commonwealth (1982) 152 CLR 
188. 
93
 James Spigelman, Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights (Mcpherson Lecture Series, 
University of Queensland Press, 2008) 62. 
94
 Ibid 12; James Spielgelman, ‘Principle of legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005) 79 
Australian Law Journal 769.  
95
 R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736, 743; Bryne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 459 
(McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
96
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson [1997] ALL ER 577, 603 (Lord 
Steyn). 
97
 Chief Justice Gleeson has played an integral role in the development of this principle in Australia; 
See Al- Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577; Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian 
Workers’ Union (2004) 211 CLR 309, 328; See also Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 46-
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law rights save ‘unmistakable and unambiguous’ language to the contrary.98 This 
principle is not novel and was expressed by O’Connor J in 1907. 99 Subsequently, 
numerous cases have emphasised the importance of this principle in the protection of 
rights.
100
 Indeed, Glesson CJ has expressed the view that this presumption is a 
manifestation of the rule of law.
101
  
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty gives parliament the prerogative to 
legislate to constrain or abrogate human rights.
102
  If parliament wishes to constrain 
or abolish rights, the words of the legislation must clearly indicate that parliament 
turned their mind to and decided as such.
103
 In what has come to be accepted as an 
authoritative statement of the principle,
104
 Lord Hoffman observed:  
                                                                                                                                                                    
7 [43] (French CJ); X7v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, 596 [87] (Hayne and 
Bell JJ). 
98
 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437; R v Secretary of state for the Home Department; Ex 
parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131-2 (Lord Hoffman). 
99
  Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304; See also Sargood Bro’s v Commonwealth (1910) 11 
CLR 258, 279 (O’ Connor J); Ex Parte Walsh and Johnson; In Re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36, 
93  (Issacs J) noted that while although Parliament has absolute power over the region it controls; 
there is the presumption that Parliament will respect fundamental common law rights; See especially, 
Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363, 447-52 [307-14] (Gageler and 
Keane JJ) 
100
 See, eg, Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437, 446; Daniels Corporation International Pty 
Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543, 553 ( Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron , Gummow and Hayne JJ); Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd 
(1993) 178 CLR 477, 517. 
101
 Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2004) 221 CLR 309, 328; See 
also Lord Irvine, above n 3, 243. Where his Lordship notes that the ‘doctrine of legality’ which 
prohibits government action in the absence of lawful justification ‘represents the kernel of the rule of 
law’. 
102
 See  Lord Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, ‘The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights’  [1992] Public Law 
397, 397 ‘The growing complexity of life has necessarily led governments , of all political shades, to 
intervene in many respects of our daily lives’. For example, parliament regularly constrains rights in 
the context of national security through the enactment of anti-terrorism laws. According to Professor 
Williams, the Commonwealth has enacted 54 individual anti- terrorism statutes from September 11 
2001 to September 11 2011 which affect or constrain numerous rights. George Williams, ‘A Decade 
of Australian Anti- Terror Laws’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 1136, 1145. 
103
 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437; Al- Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577; 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Haneef (2007) 243 ALR 606, 634; Evans v New South 
Wales (2008) 250 ALR 33, 49; K- Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licencing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501, 
520; R v Secretary of state for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131-2. 
104
  See Plaintiff S157/ 2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 (Gleeson CJ). 
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Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is 
because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning 
may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process.
105
 
The assertion that the right to a fair trial is part of this presumption centres on the fact 
that the right to a fair trial is a fundamental common law right.
106
 Indeed, 
Spigelman CJ has observed that the right to a fair trial ‘is perhaps the best established 
example of a presumption’ which forms the common law bill of rights as it is a 
fundamental common law right which amongst other things directs the formation of 
the law.
107
 As a result, any abridgement or curtailment of the right must be manifest 
in the words used by parliament.
108
  
(b) The Right to a fair trial and the binary application of the principle of legality 
It may safely be concluded that the right to a fair trial is part of the principle of 
legality and informs the interpretation of legislation. However, its application in 
practise raises certain issues. It has been argued that in practise, courts adopt a binary 
or ‘all or nothing’ approach in applying the principle of legality.109 If the court finds 
that the principle of legality can be applied to uphold a common law right, then the 
person seeking to uphold his or her rights gets the full benefit of the right.
110
 
Conversely, if the words of the relevant legislation clearly exclude such rights, that 
person cannot enjoy any benefit of the right.
111
 This results in a situation where 
judicial application of the principle of legality does not allow countervailing rights or 
                                                          
105
 R v Secretary of state for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131-2. 
106
 Spigelman, Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights, above n 93, 30-34. 
107
 See Connely v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, 1347 Lord Delvin notes that 
‘[n]early, the whole of the English criminal law of procedure and evidence has been made by the 
exercise of the judges of their power to see what was fair and just was done between the prosecutors 
and accused’ citied in Spigelman, Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights, above n 93, 31. 
108
 Spigelman, Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights, above n 93, 34-7. 
109
 Dan Meagher, ‘The Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights (2011) 35 Melbourne University 
Law Review 449, 460 citing S v Boulton (2006) 151 FCR 364, 383 (Jacobson J). 
110
 Meagher, above n 109, 461 citing R & R Fazzolari v Parramatta City Council (2009) 237 CLR 
603, 618-9 (French CJ). 
111
 Meagher, above n 109,462 citing Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 
CLR 252. 
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interests to be balanced.
112
 By contrast, what is required to uphold the right to a fair 
trial must be determined in the circumstances of the case and often requires a balance 
between countervailing interests.
113
 As a result, the binary or ‘all or nothing’ nature 
of the principle of legality in practise limits the ability of the right to inform the 
interpretation of legislation. The difficulty this brings to application of right to a fair 
trial is illustrated in the divergent approaches of the High Court in two recent cases. 
  X7 v Australian Crime Commission (i)
In X7 v Australian Crime Commission (‘X7’),114 the High Court considered the 
interplay between the principle of legality and the right to a fair trial in the context of 
the privilege against self-incrimination. The plaintiff was subject to a number of 
charges under the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) for, inter alia, allegedly conspiring to 
traffic in a controlled drug.   
The plaintiff was questioned by the Australian Crime Commission (‘ACC’) pursuant 
to the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (the ‘ACC Act’). The ACC Act 
provided that an examiner may require that a person answer such questions and 
produce such documents and things that the examiner instructs.
115
 It is an offence to 
refuse to answer such questions.
116
 However, such answers or things are not 
admissible as evidence against that person.
117
 The examiner may also specify that 
such information not be published. The examiner must so specify that the 
information not be published if it ‘might prejudice the fair trial of a person who has 
been, or may be charged with an offence’.118 The plaintiff was examined by the ACC 
in relation to the drug offences he was charged with under the Criminal Code 1995 
                                                          
112
 Meagher above n 109,462. 
113
 Dupas v The Queen (2010) 245 CLR 237, 251 [37]. 
114
 X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570. 
115
 Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 25A. 
116
 Ibid s 30 (6). 
117
 Ibid ss 30(4), (5). 
118
 Ibid s 25 A (9) (d) (emphasis added). 
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(Cth). The principal issue before the Court was whether the examiner was 
empowered to conduct an examination in relation to the offence with which the 
accused was charged.
119
  
In dissent, French CJ and Crennan J held that the legislative framework of the ACC 
Act makes the provision of evidence otherwise protected by the privilege against 
self-incrimination mandatory.
120
 On the other hand, the ACC Act restricted the 
publication of such information and ensured the fair trial of the accused.
121
 As such, 
the ACC Act contemplated that the public interest in the prosecution of alleged 
criminals outweighed the privilege against self-incrimination.
122
 Their Honours also 
placed weight on the fact that the ACC Act preserved the onus of proof the 
prosecution bears.
123
 Further, it was observed that other safeguards, such as the use 
only of derivative evidence (evidence which is derived from the direct evidence) and 
the discretion of the trial judge to exclude evidence which is unfairly prejudicial were 
also protected.
124
 As a result, their Honours held that the ACC Act did allow the 
examination. 
On the other hand, Hayne and Bell JJ (Keifel J agreeing) did not base their 
judgement on the fairness or unfairness of the examination and its impact on the fair 
trial. Their honours were of the view that the whole of the criminal law has been 
developed as an accusatorial process.
125
 The prosecution therefore must prove the 
                                                          
119
 X7 v Australian Crime Commission 298 (2013) ALR 570, 573. The other issue before the Court 
was whether the examination under the ACC Act contravened the ‘constitutional right to a fair trial 
under Ch III (including s 80) of the Constitution’. The Court did not find it necessary to determine this 
issue.  
120
 Ibid 570-80 [28-9]. 
121
 Ibid 580 [30]. 
122
 Ibid. 
123
 Ibid 588-59 [55] it was held that the ‘fair trial’ in ss 25 (9) , (11) of the ACC Act ‘must be 
informed by the fundamental principle that the onus of proof of the offence rests on the prosecution, 
whom the accused is not required to assist, and by the rule that accused is not compellable at his or her 
trial’. 
124
 Ibid 588-9 [52-59]. 
125
 Ibid 598 [97-101]; But See Assistant Commissioner Cordon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 
638, 682 [157] ( Hayne , Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ) ‘ Consideration of other judicial systems may 
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guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
126
 The accused need not, in any way, 
assist the prosecution in proving his or her guilt. Any modification to this would need 
to be express or clearly implied from the legislation.
127
 There were no express words 
in the ACC Act and no implication could be drawn which permitted an examiner to 
conduct an examination on a criminal charge the subject of which was an offence 
under that charge.
128
 As such, the court must interpret the legislation so as to uphold 
the right against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the majority found that the plaintiff 
enjoyed the full benefit of the right and was not required to undergo the examination.  
 Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (ii)
This binary application of the principle of legality, as limiting the application of the 
right to a fair trial, is depicted in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission 
(‘Lee’).129 In this case, the Court had to consider whether s 31D of the Criminal 
Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) (‘the CAR Act’) allowed the examination of 
persons who had been charged but not convicted of an offence where the subject of 
the examination concerned the subject of those charges.
130
  
Among other things, the CAR Act provided that if the New South Wales Crime 
Commission makes an application to the Supreme Court for a confiscation order, the 
Court may make ‘an order for the examination on oath’ of either the ‘affected 
person’ or ‘another person’.131 Such an examination would be made before the Court 
or an Officer of the Court pursuant to the Rules of Court.
132
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
be taken to demonstrate that it cannot be assumed that an adversarial system of adjudication is the 
only fair means of resolving disputes’. 
126
 X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 588, 598-9 [101] See also the reasons of 
Keifel J who notes that this principle has a ‘constitutional dimension’: at 613 [160]. 
127
 Ibid 604 [124-5]. 
128
 Ibid 609 [142]. 
129
 Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363. 
130
 See Ibid 438-9 [267-9] (Gageler and Keane JJ). 
131
 Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) s 31D. 
132
 Ibid. 
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The appellants argued that permitting the examination would unfairly prejudice the 
defence as counsel could not lead evidence, cross examine or give submissions 
which proposed an alternative factual scenario than that given by the client in the 
examination.
133
 
In contrast to X7, the majority, French CJ, Crennan, Keane and Gageler JJ held that 
the CAR Act did permit such an examination.  In separate judgements, French CJ 
and Crennan J held that s 31D, read in light of the purpose and the legislative 
framework of the CAR Act, permitted such an examination. Their Honours held that 
in contemplating that such an examination be conducted only before a Court or an 
Officer of the Court, the CAR Act did not pursue this end at all costs.
134
 This is 
because the Court or an Officer of the Court had the power to modify the 
examination or otherwise prevent an unfair trial.
135
 In this sense, their Honours 
adopted similar reasoning to that expressed in X7. 
 The minority, Hayne, Bell and Keifel JJ gave much weight to the precedent set in X7 
and were reluctant to deviate from the principle so expressed.
136
 Although as Keane 
and Gageler JJ were not on the Bench in X7, the concentration on the joint judgement 
of their Honours is helpful.
137
  
Justices Keane and Gageler outlined the principle of legality and noted that it is a 
longstanding and fundamental rule of statutory interpretation.
138
 However, their 
Honours held that the right to silence and other interrelated rights may be limited in 
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 Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363, 449 [304-5]. 
134
 Ibid [55-6] (French CJ), 62 [143-4] (Crennan J). 
135
 Ibid 389-90 [55-6] (French CJ), 410 [143-4] (Crennan J). 
136
 Ibid 392-5 [69] – [84] (Hayne J), 86 [213] (Kiefel J), 103 [265] (Bell J). 
137
 Ibid 392 [70] Justice Hayne observed that ‘[a]ll that has changed between the decision in X7 and 
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138
 Ibid 449-52 [307-314]. 
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certain cases.
139
 Indeed, the right to silence ‘is not monolithic: it is neither singular 
nor immutable’.140 Further, while the criminal trial operates on an accusatorial 
foundation, there is, in Australia, ‘no free standing or general right of a person 
charged with a criminal offence to remain silent’.141  
It was held that although the defence may be limited to the facts as produced in the 
examination, this does not alter the accusatorial trial as the prosecution retains the 
burden to prove the guilt of the accused.
142
 Read in light of other provisions of the 
CAR Act, s 31D permitted an examination in relation to criminal offences 
irrespective of whether the examination concerned the subject of those charges.
143
  
Indeed, s 31D was a result of ‘carefully integrated and elaborate legislative 
design’.144 Consequently, the examination under this provision did not result in a 
‘real risk of interference with the administration of justice’ solely because the subject 
of the examination coincided with the subject of the charge.
145
 The CAR Act 
contemplated such a situation and allowed for the examination to be conducted by 
the Supreme Court or an Officer of the Court. 
146
 This allowed for the risk of an 
interference with the administration of justice to be mitigated as the Court or an 
Officer of the Court was able to vary such an examination so as to prevent 
unfairness. 
147
 In contrast to X7, the appellants in this case did not enjoy any benefit 
of the right to silence. Their right to silence (and privilege against self-incrimination) 
were held to be limited by the CAR Act.  
                                                          
139
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Thus from the divergent approaches of the High Court in X7 and Lee, it may be 
suggested that insofar as the right to a fair trial is part of the principle of legality, it 
does not confer much substantive protection. In part, this may be due to the broad 
and indeterminate scope of the right which causes much difficulty in its application. 
The judgement of Hayne and Bell JJ in X7 is illustrative of this. Their Honours noted 
that the question of whether the examination of a person charged with an offence on 
the subject of the charge is fair or unfair ‘at best would be unhelpful and at worst, 
would be distracting’ as there is no objective standard of fairness on which such a 
question can be answered.
148
 Thereafter in Lee, the right to a fair trial did not inform 
the interpretation of the relevant provision of the CAR Act. Rather, the majority were 
of the view that it was within the power of parliament to legislate to modify or curtail 
the right to silence (and its related rights). Thus, the words of the CAR Act, read in 
light of the purpose of the legislation are that which should be followed. 
Indeed McHugh J has previously stressed that while vague concepts such as fairness 
are appealing on paper, they often cause uncertainty in practise.
149
 The ambiguity of 
such terms causes much disagreement when it comes to applying those terms to a set 
of facts.
150
 This limits the utility of such standards.
151
 Although there is a risk that 
well defined rules may be limited in scope, such rules are preferred as they promote 
certainty in the everyday administration of justice.
152
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  Abuse of process and the right to a fair trial  3
The second way in which the right to a fair trial is manifested is through the power of 
the court to prevent an abuse of its processes.
153
  Generally speaking, an abuse of 
process is commonly ‘found in the use of criminal process inconsistently with some 
aspect of its true purpose’.154 Such a power stems from the policy interests of 
maintaining and defending public confidence in the administration of justice.
155
 
However, the exercise of this power must be balanced against the public interest in 
ensuing that persons charged with a crime are tried.
156
 This consideration weighs 
heavily in the exercise of this power as stay of proceedings is ‘tantamount to a 
continuing immunity from prosecution’157 and therefore will only be exercised 
‘sparingly and with the utmost caution’.158 If courts are too quick to grant a stay, 
victims of a crime who are not party to the proceedings, may lose confidence in the 
administration of justice and ‘be driven to self-help to rectify their grievances’.159 In 
what has been labelled an ‘authoritative statement of principle’160 Brennan J held that 
the court will only exercise the power to stay proceedings if there is a ‘fundamental 
defect’  resulting in unfairness which the court is otherwise powerless to prevent.161  
Thus while the court does have the power to stay a trial for an abuse of process, not 
every abuse of process will be severe or fundamental enough to warrant a permanent 
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stay.
162
 The court therefore, has a broad discretion to modify the trial to prevent an 
abuse of process if the unfairness is not serious enough to warrant a stay.
163
 
The concept of an abuse of process was addressed by Kourakis J in Police (SA) v 
Sherlock.
164
 His Honour explained that an abuse of process can be classed as 
stemming from either: a) the concept of a fair trial in the sense that the circumstances 
would result in an unfair trial to the accused; or, b) that proceedings were 
commenced for an improper purpose.
165
 The court need not be satisfied that an unfair 
trial would result in the latter instance as the primary interest lies in maintaining 
public confidence in the administration of justice.
166
 While unfairness to the accused 
is a relevant consideration in determining whether there is an abuse of process in this 
regard, the emphasis must be on the institutions charged with the administration of 
justice. 
167
  
This was illustrated in Moti v The Queen.
168
 Julian Moti, an Australian citizen (and 
the former Attorney General of the Solomon Islands), was charged with sexual 
intercourse with a person under 16 years while he was outside of Australia.
169
 His 
grounds of appeal were that there was an abuse of process arising out of substantial 
payments from the Commonwealth to the victim’s family and that his deportation 
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was unlawful as it was in substance an extradition.
170
 In the High Court, the majority 
was of the view that the payments were lawfully made and proper in the 
circumstances.
171
 The majority held that an abuse of process was grounded in the 
notion that ‘the end of criminal prosecution does not justify the adoption of any and 
every means’.172 Emphasis was placed on the conduct of Australian authorities and 
the need to guard the public confidence in the administration of justice.
173
 
Consequently, it was held that due to the impropriety surrounding the circumstances 
under which Moti was brought to Australia continuing prosecution would be an 
abuse of process.  
This being said, it has been observed that it is not in the interest of justice to 
completely disassociate the right to a fair trial and an abuse of process. As Toohey J 
points out, if we were to conceive of these two concepts as separate and distinct from 
each other, what will remedy an abuse of process might not remedy an unfair trial.
174
 
As such, ‘…greater justice will be achieved if the two notions are understood as 
bearing on each other.’175 In Police (SA) v Sherlock, 176 Doyle CJ concluded, amongst 
other things, that the power to stay a trial to prevent an abuse of process is antecedent 
to the right to a fair trial.
177
 Indeed if the judicial system is to be viewed as 
independent and impartial, it must have a broad scope to determine what amounts to 
an abuse of process and to stay proceedings for an abuse of process even where a fair 
trial is attainable.
178
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   The rules of evidence and the right to a fair trial 4
Finally, the right to a fair trial finds vivid expression through the law of evidence.
179
 
However, it is impossible to completely separate the various manifestations of the 
right especially in light of the fact that the law of evidence is largely embodied in 
statute through the various Evidence Acts.
180
 Indeed, when interpreting the provisions 
of any of the Evidence Acts, there is a presumption that the legislature did not intend 
to abrogate or modify fundamental common law doctrines.
181
     
The link between evidence and rights is clear. Chief Justice Spigelman notes that 
generally speaking, the laws of evidence are centred on seeking the truth.
182
 
However, this pursuit is not absolute and insofar as the laws of evidence derogate 
from its truth seeking goal, it is to protect countervailing rights.
183
 The goal of factual 
accuracy also promotes human rights. The substantive law must be proved though 
the rules of evidence and while some cases turn on purely legal issues, the majority 
of cases focus on questions of fact.
184
 A factually correct application of the 
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substantive law would include accurate application of the law pertaining to human 
rights.
185
 
The law of evidence serve two interrelated functions. First, it prescribes the rules 
applicable to the admissibility of matters required to prove the facts in issue.
186
 
Second, it prescribes the way in which such matters are presented to the court.
187
 
That is, evidence seeks to ascertain ‘facts’ through a ‘rational’ procedure.188   
 In this regard, discretion plays a significant part in the exclusion of relevant 
evidence. Relevant evidence may be excluded if, for example, it may cause an 
‘undue waste of time’.189 More pertinently, relevant evidence may be excluded on 
the grounds of unfairness (the ‘general unfairness discretion’).190 This discretion is 
founded on the need to secure a fair trial.
191
 In Australia, this discretion was first 
used in the context of confession evidence.
192
  Although at present it is clear that it 
applies to all evidence.
193
 Thus in R v Lobban,
194
 Martin J emphasised the courts 
distinct discretion to exclude relevant evidence if the ‘strict rules of admissibility 
would operate unfairly against the accused’.195  
                                                          
185
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This general discretion has its roots in a narrower discretion first expressed in the 
seminal case of R v Christie (the ‘Christie Discretion’).196 As aforementioned, the 
object of this discretion is the protection of the fair trial.
197
 The Christie Discretion 
allows the trial judge to exclude evidence which is more prejudicial than 
probative.
198
  It serves to prevent the jury from giving undue weight to evidence and 
maintains the accuracy of the verdict.
199
 As all relevant evidence is prima facie 
admissible, this discretion allows the judge to exclude evidence which may misguide 
the jury by unfairly employing their prejudice at the expense of factual accuracy.
200
 
This discretion cannot be exercised merely on the basis that the evidence is 
prejudicial to the accused.  The court will exclude the evidence ‘if the evidence has 
little or no weight but may be gravely prejudicial to the accused’.201 Conversely, if 
the evidence is highly probative as well as highly prejudicial, ‘the fact that its 
prejudicial effect is also high is nothing to point’.202 The common law position is 
largely reflected in ss 135-7 of the Evidence Act the only clear difference being the 
definition of probative value.
203
  
It is evident that there is much overlap between the general unfairness discretion and 
the narrower Christie Discretion. It has been noted that notwithstanding confession 
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evidence, it difficult to envisage circumstances which will warrant the exercise of the 
unfairness discretion instead of the Christie Discretion.
204
 These two discretions 
diverge however in one important respect. Ligertwood and Edmond contend that the 
Christie Discretion serves primarily to ensure the factual accuracy of the evidence 
and prevent wrongful convictions on the grounds of inaccurate facts.
205
  The scope of 
the broader unfairness discretion extends to the protection of matters beyond factual 
accuracy.
206
  
  Conclusions 5
As it has been argued that the right to a fair trial at common law manifests itself in 
three broad but interrelated ways. First, it can be conceived as a rule of statutory 
interpretation. Second, it is present in the inherent power of the court to prevent an 
abuse of its process. This power is focused on the agencies responsible for the 
administration of justice. Finally, the right is present in the rules of evidence, most 
visibly through the unfairness discretion.  
It is also clear that the application of the right is contingent on the circumstances of 
the case. Where the admission of evidence has the potential to cause unfairness, the 
court may exclude it using the Christie Discretion.
207
 In cases where the evidence 
was improperly obtained, such evidence may be excluded through the public policy 
discretion.
208
 If the unfairness stems from some procedural aspect of the trial, such as 
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an improper extradition or delay, the court has the power to stay or modify a trial to 
prevent an abuse of process.
209
  
However, if the root of the unfairness stems from the application of a statute, the 
remedies are much narrower in scope. Although the right to a fair trial can inform the 
interpretation of legislation, the binary application of the principle of legality limits 
the right to a fair trial. This is clear from the decision in Lee. Further, the right to a 
fair trial may be limited through the words of the statute. Parliament may, through 
‘unmistakable and unambiguous language’, limit or abolish rights.210 In such 
circumstances it is ‘not for the courts …to determine whether the course taken by 
parliament is unjust or contrary to human rights’.211 
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III  HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
 Objectives of the criminal process – protection of rights and the legitimacy of A
the verdict 
It is the ‘overriding objective’ of criminal procedure ‘that criminal cases be dealt 
with justly’ which involves, among other things, recognising the right to a fair 
trial.
212
 In this sense, the right, at its most basic, refers to a trial where precise 
application of the legal principles has been carried out through an independent and 
impartial tribunal pursuant to the laws of evidence.
213
 The right is also ‘an evolving 
concept which has a number of dimensions, some of which are concrete while others 
are poorly defined’.214  Thus Spigelman CJ notes the right to a fair trial is best 
thought of as the ‘principle of the fair trial’.215  
As will be explained below, it is fundamental that the criminal trial produce a 
factually accurate verdict. However, it ‘does not involve the pursuit of truth by any 
means’.216  The criminal trial must also protect the rights of the defendant.217 It has 
been seen that the common law contains some of these protections and the specific 
protection available largely depends on the particular circumstances of the case. 
Indeed, the common law right to due process is grounded in ‘a defendant – protective 
philosophical base’.218  As will be explained below, these protections to the right to a 
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fair trial are also contained most broadly in the Constitution and more specifically in 
the Charter and the HRA.  
While the right extends throughout the legal process, its operation is most vivid in 
the criminal trial. Professor Ho notes that the importance of the criminal trial derives 
from its position as regulating the exercise of power by the executive.
219
 Protections 
which restrain the exercise of power to protect rights are desirable because they 
promote the recognition and legitimacy of the verdict.
220
 Therefore, if the trial is seen 
as regulating the exercise of coercive power by the executive, a breach of fair trial 
standards ‘is in itself  a wrong’.221 It is a wrong because the state has exercised its 
power without proper validation or justification.
222
 Consequently, breaches of fair 
trial rights serve to dilute the legitimacy the verdict in the eyes of society.
223
 
It is this aspect of the fair trial which is the focus of the following analysis. 
Concentration will be on the extent to which parliament is able to legislate to limit or 
curtail the right to a fair trial. This involves testing the strength of the fair trial 
protections embodied in the Charter, HRA and the Constitution and the extent to 
which they can be reconciled with the right to a fair trial in its fullest sense. This 
issue is pertinent as ‘[l]egislative action is more likely to violate fundamental rights 
than legislative inaction’224.   
 
 
                                                          
219
 Ho Hock Lai, Liberalism and the Criminal Trial (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 243, 244 
220
 Ibid 253-4; But See Ashworth and Redmayne, above n 41, 25 who caution against theories which 
focus on legitimacy as ‘[l]egitimacy is a rather elusive concept’. 
221
 Ho, above n 219, 254 (emphasis in original); Allan, Constitutional Justice, above n 49, 271-2. 
222
 Ho, above n 219, 254. 
223
 Ibid ;See also Assistant Commissioner Cordon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638, 688 [186] 
(Gageler J) ‘Unfairness in the procedure of a court saps confidence in the judicial process and 
undermines the integrity of the court as an institution that exists for the administration of justice’ 
224
 Richard H Fallon, The core of an Uneasy Case For Judicial Review (2008) 121(7) Harvard Law 
Review 1693, 1700. 
34 
 
 Human Rights and the Fair Trial- An Overview B
In Australia, the right to a fair trial is not an express constitutional right although it 
has been observed that its implication derives from the separation of judicial power 
in Chapter III of the Constitution.
225
 More recently, the right has found statutory 
protection in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria through the Human Rights 
Act 2004 (ACT) (‘the HRA’) and the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic) (‘the Charter’).226  
This chapter fulfils two interrelated objectives; first, it elucidates the protection 
conferred on the right to a fair trial by the Charter and the HRA. Second it contends 
that insofar as providing a remedy to legislation which infringes on the right to a fair 
trial, these statutory rights instruments do not represent a significant deviation from 
the pre-existing common law approach outlined above.  
 Varying approaches to the right to a fair trial 1
While various instruments provide for the right to a fair trial, there exist significant 
differences as to how the right is expressed and applied. Given such differences, it is 
neither feasible nor productive to engage in an analysis of every expression of the 
right. As Lord Hoffman notes, ‘at the level of abstraction, human rights may be 
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universal’.227 However, upon application, such rights often lead to a ‘messy detail of 
concrete problems’.228  
Even within a given jurisdiction, fair trial rights can take many different forms. In the 
United States for instance, there is debate as to whether the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution confers a right to procedural or 
substantive due process.
229
 ‘Procedural due process’ refers to fairness in relation to 
the procedures or conduct of the trial.
230
 ‘Substantive due process’ arises were laws 
which unfairly deny an individual’s ‘‘life, liberty or property’ are struck down even 
if those individuals receive an adjudication in which ‘the fairest possible 
procedure[s]’ are observed’.231 Further, from these two broad conceptions of due 
process, at least eight different subclasses of due process can be discerned.
232
   
Even the Charter and the HRA are not homogeneous in relation to the fair trial. The 
Charter confers the right only to a ‘person charged with a criminal offence or a party 
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to a civil proceeding’.233 By contrast, under the HRA, ‘[e]veryone has the right to… 
a fair hearing.
234
 Arguably, the restrictive wording of the Charter is inconsistent with 
the right to a fair trial which must be fair to all parties beyond those directly involved 
in the trial.
235
 For instance, in family law, the interests of the children are always the 
foremost priority even though the dispute may be between the parents of the child. 
236
 
Thus non-parties to proceedings under the Charter may not be protected by the right 
to a fair trial and must rely on other substantive provisions of the Act.
237
 This being 
said, the divergent approaches in the different rights instruments are most apparent in 
relation to their basis of enforcement.  
 Basis of enforcement 2
Fundamentally, some of these rights documents are constitutional while others are 
statutory. Instruments such as the United States Constitution (and the Australian 
Constitution) protect rights through the judicial review of legislation.
238
 The United 
States model, rooted in the principle of Marbury v Madison,
239
 involves; first, 
conferring rights more authority than ordinary legislation.
240
 Second it necessitates 
precluding such rights from repeal or amendment through the ordinary legislative 
process.
241
 Finally, enforcement of their authority occurs ‘by means of judicial power 
to set aside conflicting legislation exercise of which is unreviewable by ordinary 
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legislative majority’.242 This is a stark deviation from the traditional British approach 
to the protection of rights which retains parliamentary supremacy subject to certain 
fundamental common law doctrines.
243
  
Instruments such as the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (the ‘HRA UK’), the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), the Charter and the HRA, are indicative of a 
shift toward ‘a new third model of constitutionalism which straddles the gap between 
a fully constitutionalized bill of rights and full legislative supremacy’.244 These 
instruments rejected the American – style judicial review.245 Their focus is on 
informing parliament as to the formulation of law and policy to prevent breaches of 
human rights from the outset.
246
 In this sense, it fosters a ‘dialogue’ between the 
various arms of government to ensure that respect for fundamental rights is borne in 
mind in the everyday exercise of executive power.
247
  
  The Charter, the HRA, the HRA UK and the Right to a Fair Trial C
 An Outline  1
While there are certain differences, these Acts enforce rights though similar 
mechanisms. First, the Charter, HRA and HRA UK entrench fundamental human 
rights such as the right to a fair trial, right to life and freedom of expression.
248
 If a 
legislative provision limits the human rights expressed in the Acts, such a limitation 
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is reasonable if it can be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’249 
(the ‘justification provision’). If a legislative provision unreasonably limits a right, 
the court can interpret the provision to enforce the right subject to the purpose of the 
legislation (the interpretation provision).
250
 If such an interpretation is not possible, 
then the court may make a declaration of inconsistency (the declaration provision).
251
 
However, the validity of an Act is not affected even if it found that it cannot be 
interpreted consistently with human rights.
252
 According to Dr. Debeljak this is the 
‘preferred method’.253  
 Interpretation 2
The role of interpretation is significant in light of the dialogue model of rights 
protection embodied in the Charter, HRA and HRA UK.
254
  Indeed, it is the opinion 
of Sir Philip Sales that the interpretation provision of the HRA UK ‘will be the 
leading statutory principle in the future concerning interpretation of statutes in light 
of fundamental human rights’255 Further, as seen above, pursuant to the principle of 
legality, statutes will be interpreted in light of the right to a fair trial save express 
words to the contrary. 
As aforementioned, despite the fact that both the HRA and the Charter are based on 
the HRA UK, their operation is not consistent with that in the United Kingdom.  This 
is especially so in relation to the interpretive provisions of the Acts. The three Acts 
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have similar interpretation provisions which provide that ‘[s]o far as it is possible to 
do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a 
way that is compatible with human rights’256   
 The United Kingdom approach 3
In relation to the HRA UK, the interpretation provision, s 3, has been a key 
mechanism of judicial enforcement of human rights.
257
 Indeed, it has been given an 
expansive application.
258
 In Ghaidian v Godin-Mendoza,
259
 s 3 of the HRA UK was 
applied in relation to discriminatory provisions in the Rent Act 1977 (UK). It was 
held that the meaning of a legislative provision given by application of s 3 HRA UK 
must be consistent ‘with the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed’.260 
Aside from this however, the Court is able to adopt a broad interpretation of the 
legislation so as to make it ‘Convention- compliant’.261 Thus for the purposes of the 
Rent Act, ‘marriage’ was construed as ‘living together’.262  It has been acknowledged 
that this case reflects the current approach in relation to s 3 of the HRA UK.
263
  
In the UK, it may be suggested that as long as an interpretation does not go against 
‘the grain of the legislation’264 statutes will be interpreted to give full effect to the 
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right to a fair trial.
265
 This obligation extends over and above the principle of legality 
at common law.
266
 As Lord Steyn describes, this approach is ‘remedial’.267  Thus 
Gardbaum has observed that under the interpretation provision in the UK, ‘courts 
have advanced beyond even the broadest conception of their pre- HRA common law 
rights- protective interpretive powers’268 
 The Australian approach - Momcilovic v The Queen 4
Necessarily, the position in Australia is different from that of Ghaidian in light of the 
particular federal and judicial structure entrenched by the Constitution.
269
 This was 
made clear in the most significant High Court case to consider the provisions of the 
Charter (which largely applies to the HRA),
270
 Momcilovic v The Queen 
(‘Momcilovic’).271 While the decision in Momcilovic did not centre specifically on 
the right to a fair trial it focused on the presumption of innocence which is a 
fundamental component of the right to a fair trial.
272
 
In that case, Vera Momcilovic was found guilty of drug trafficking pursuant to the 
Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981(Vic) (‘the Drugs Act’).273 Her 
partner, Velimir Markovski, who lived in the same apartment, was convicted for 
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possession of drugs in a separate trial and he testified that Momcilovic was not aware 
of the presence of the drugs.
274
 Section 5 of the Drugs Act operated to reverse the 
onus to the defendant to prove that she was unaware of the drugs.
275
 However, this 
was not consistent with the presumption of innocence is expressed in s 25(1) of the 
Charter. Further, as noted above, s 32 of the Charter provides that all statutes must be 
interpreted in light of human rights. Momcilovic argued that in light of s 32 of the 
Charter, s 5 of the Drugs Act operated to impose only an evidential burden as 
opposed to a legal burden.
276
 Also, the issue of whether the power to make a 
declaration of inconsistency under s 36 (2) is a valid exercise of judicial power was 
considered. 
A majority held that s 5 was not applicable to the offence contained in s 71 AC of the 
Drugs Act. As such, the lower court had misdirected the jury.
277
 Significantly, in 
relation to the interpretation provision of the Charter, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ held that it did not permit the court to separate from the 
clear meaning of s 5 of the Drugs Act. 
278
 Essentially, as French CJ held, any 
variation to the established process of statutory interpretation must be clearly 
expressed by parliament.
279
 It is not clear from the text of the provision that 
Parliament intended that such a change to established principles be made.
280
 The 
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other justices expressed largely corresponding views.
281
 As such s 5 could not be 
interpreted to impose only an evidential burden. In this sense, the interpretation 
provision of the Charter operates the same as the principle of legality at common 
law.
282
  
In relation to the justification provision, four out of seven justices held that it 
informed the interpretation provision.
283
 Justice Heydon held that the justification 
provision was too vague to be applied. In his Honours view, it ‘is highly general, 
indeterminate, lofty, aspirational and abstract. It is nebulous turbid and cloudy’.284 
Further, a majority held that the declaration provision was not an exercise or 
incidental to an exercise of judicial power and therefore it cannot be exercised where 
Victorian courts exercise federal jurisdiction.
285
  It is clear from Momcilovic that any 
adoption of the Ghaidian approach would be inconsistent with Chapter III of the 
Constitution.
286
 Further, it can be suggested that application of the justification 
provision is also inconsistent with Chapter III as it may be classed as an exercise of 
non-judicial power.
287
    
 The limits of the ‘dialogue model’ of rights protection in Australia 5
While the issues surrounding the right to a fair trial and the Constitution are 
examined below, the separation of judicial power as expressed in Chapter III has an 
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impact on the Charter and the HRA. As Bateman and Stellios observe, it is evident 
that a ‘remedial style’ interpretation would be inconsistent with the separation of 
powers in Chapter III of the Constitution.
288
 Further, the Kable Principle may limit 
the application of this provision as it cannot be applied in circumstances where 
Victorian courts exercise federal jurisdiction.
289
 In short, by fostering a ‘dialogue’ 
between the various arms of government, the Charter risks constitutional 
invalidity.
290
  
All things considered, it is suggested that there is little difference between the 
operation of the right at common law and under the Charter and the HRA. For 
instance, in Slaveski v Smith,
291
 the issue of whether the Victorian Legal Aid (VLA) 
is obliged to provide legal aid when the applicant satisfies the conditions of the Legal 
Aid Act 1978 (Vic) was considered in light of the right to a fair trial as expressed in 
the Charter. It was held that the requirement to interpret statutes in light of the fair 
trial did not permit deviation from the meaning of the statutory provisions.
292
 Thus, 
the Court held that the relevant provisions did allow the VLA discretion to determine 
the allocation of legal aid.
293
 The Court also held that in relation to the right to legal 
representation, the right to a fair trial under the Charter ‘is no more than reflective of 
the position at common law’.294 Indeed, the fair trial provisions of the Charter were 
not brought up in subsequent cases which considered the right to a fair trial and self-
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represented litigants.
295
 Further, it is also arguable that other fair trial rights such as 
the right to cross examine have not been significantly bolstered by the enactment of 
the Charter.
296
   
 Conclusions D
While the waters of the dialogue charters remain murky,
297
 it is open to suggest that 
it does not represent a significant deviation from the pre-existing common law 
approach in relation to remedying legislative provisions which abrogate the right to a 
fair trial. This being said, because the Charter and HRA express a positive right as 
opposed to the common law position (‘the right not to be tried unfairly’), it allows 
the accused persons to be made aware of their right to a fair trial.
298
 This may serve 
to promote its enforcement.
299
  
All things considered however, the Momcilovic decision limits any UK style 
‘remedial’ interpretation from being part of the Charter and HRA. Also, it is clear 
from this case that the Constitution presents particular challenges to any attempt to 
legislate in relation to human rights.
300
 Thus a fundamental issue which must be 
addressed is whether the right to a fair trial is constitutionally protected. 
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IV   CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The right to a fair trial has been distinguished as ‘the most fundamental constitutional 
right of all’.301 The constitutional issues surrounding the right are significant as the 
criminal trial is directly influenced by the relationship between the various arms of 
government.
302
 Further, there is a strong connection between the separation of 
powers and the doctrine of due process.
303
 As Brandeis J observed, the separation of 
powers does not seek to ‘promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power’304   
On its face, the issue of whether the right to a fair trial is entrenched in the 
Constitution is uncontroversial. Justices Deane and Gaudron have held that the right 
is implied from the separation of judicial power and entrenchment of an independent 
and impartial judiciary in Chapter III.
305
 Further, Spigelman CJ has observed that the 
right to a fair trial has become such a fundamental principle as to give it a 
constitutional character.
306
 His Honour suggests that although the right to a fair trial 
is a common law right, it has become so central to justice that parliament is unlikely 
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ever to legislate contrary to this right.
307
 Therefore, the right to a fair trial has been 
conferred constitutional complexion.
308
  
There are however, a number of issues which cast doubt on a constitutionally implied 
right to a fair trial. For one, a constitutional right to a fair trial has the potential to 
work against the interests of justice as it would mean that legislation which operated 
to reduce the time and expense of litigation would be inoperable.
309
 Another issue is 
that the federal parliament does legislate contrary to the right to a fair trial in a 
number of contexts. The most apparent being that of anti-terror legislation.
310
 Indeed, 
Professor Williams has noted that there are laws which permit, among other things, 
detention for up to a week, searches without a warrant, preventative detention orders 
and intrusive surveillance measures to prevent terrorist acts.
311
 The learned author 
contends that it is difficult if not impossible to challenge the constitutional validity of 
such laws in the absence of a federal bill of rights.
312
   
It is argued that while the right to a fair trial can be implied in the Constitution, the 
right is not constitutionally entrenched in the full sense of the term. This analysis 
builds primarily on two characteristics of the right (as explained above). First it 
shows that the right to a fair trial is made up of a number of rights whose content 
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cannot be exhaustively defined. Second, it is an illustration that the right in its full 
sense cannot be confined to the trial alone and extends from investigation to appeal.  
This chapter will first outline the separation of judicial power in Chapter III. Second, 
it will briefly examine the notion of implied rights from Chapter III jurisprudence 
and the right to a fair trial expressed by Deane and Gaudron JJ in Dietrich v The 
Queen.
313
 Thereafter, it considers the principle in Kable v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NSW) and the extension of an independent and impartial judiciary to 
the states.
314
 Finally, it argues any implied ‘constitutional right to a fair trial’ does 
not encompass the right to a fair trial in the full sense of the term.  
 The Separation of Powers and Chapter III A
 Overview 1
At its core, the separation of powers as expressed in the Constitution serves to 
safeguard individual rights through the resolution of controversies by an impartial 
and independent judiciary.
315
 The notion of separating judicial power so as to 
safeguard rights can be drawn from Montesquieu who wrote that ‘there is no liberty 
if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and the executive’.316 
Indeed, this doctrine was incorporated into the United States Constitution and 
thereby formed the basis for s 71 of the Australian Constitution.
317
 Separating 
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judicial power from the legislative and executive branches fulfils the constitutional 
objectives of preventing the interference of politics with the judiciary and the 
judiciary from acting as to diminish public confidence in the administration of 
justice.
318
 In other words, it entrenches a judiciary which is independent and 
impartial.
319
  
   Constitutional framework  2
It has been emphasised that Chapter III of the Constitution provides an ‘exhaustive’ 
statement of the methods in which judicial power may be conferred.
320
 The 
Boilermakers’ Case established a ‘high standard’ for the separation of the judicial 
and non-judicial powers in Australia.
321
 In Boilermakers, two fundamental principles 
were enunciated; first, parliament can only vest judicial power in the High Court and 
‘in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it 
invests with federal jurisdiction’.322 Second, courts which exercise federal judicial 
power cannot exercise non judicial power unless it is incidental to the exercise of 
judicial power.
323
 In this regard, although the term ‘judicial power’ cannot be 
exhaustively defined it has been held as; power exercised to resolve an issue in 
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relation to life, liberty or property as between citizens.
324
  Further, it must result in an 
‘authoritative and binding decision’.325 
The separation of powers doctrine is clearly evinced in s 71 which defines judicial 
power as distinct from other powers.
326
 Section 72 provides for tenure which is 
crucial in ensuring the independence of judges.
327
 Moreover, s 51(xxxix) expressly 
indicates that Parliament may make laws ‘incidental to the execution’ of the power of 
the federal judicature suggesting that Parliament must look to Chapter III if it wishes 
to legislate on judicial power. 
328
 Indeed, the separation of judicial power is ‘the most 
resilient’ of the implications derived from the Constitution.329  
 Separation of judicial power and the fair trial 3
In the early 1990’s, there were a succession of cases which culminated in the 
recognition of rights such as a ‘due process’ principle being implied from the 
separation of judicial power.
330
 Thus in 2001, McHugh J noted (extra judicially) that 
in light of  the decisions in the previous 15 years, it is difficult to see legislatures 
abrogating due process  and ‘quasi substantive rights’ such as  the right to a fair trial 
or the presumption of innocence.
331
  Further, his Honour suggested that in relation to 
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the fair trial, the rights expressed in various international instruments such as the 
ICCPR may eventually be found to be protected by Chapter III.
332
 
Indeed, in Polyukhovic, it was held, inter alia, that laws which determine guilt based 
on retrospective conduct are contrary to Chapter III as they infringe on judicial 
power.
333
 The implication derived from Chapter III was expressed by Deane J in 
Polyyukhovic, that ‘…the Constitution’s intent and meaning were that judicial power 
would be exercised by those courts acting as courts with all that notion essentially 
requires’.334 Thereafter, in Leeth v Commonwealth,335 Leeth argued that a federal law 
which used state law to determine non parole periods for a federal offence was 
invalid as it infringed the right to equality before the law implied in the 
Constitution.
336
 While it was held that there was a constitutional right to equality, it 
was not infringed in that case. The majority held that the implication derived from 
the separation of judicial power is that the exercise of this power by Courts must be 
coextensive with the duty to adhere to the requirements of the curial process.
337
  
Then in Chu Kheng Lim it was held that the legislature cannot require the exercise of 
judicial power in a way that is contrary to the judicial process.
338
 As such, citizens 
have ‘a constitutional immunity’ from imprisonment except by an order of a court 
through the application of Commonwealth judicial power under s 51 (xix) of the 
Constitution.
339
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 Professor Zines has pointed out that the protection of individual rights requires more 
than an independent judiciary but also recognition that procedures are in accord with 
‘“due process, “a fair trial” or “natural justice”.’ 340 As the learned author earlier 
observed, this is only a ‘short step’ from the requirement that Courts exercise judicial 
power.
341
 Indeed, these three cases, read together, shed new light on the separation of 
powers with their focus on civil and political rights.
342
 It is through this lens in which 
the judgement in Dietrich is best appreciated. 
  Dietrich v The Queen 4
The seminal case in relation to the right to a fair trial in Australia is Dietrich v The 
Queen (‘Dietrich’).343 There, Olaf Dietrich was unrepresented in his trial for the 
importation of heroin. He was convicted and appealed to the High Court on the 
grounds that a fair trial entails the right to provision of legal representation by the 
state to persons charged with a serious criminal offence.
344
 Justice Brennan, in 
dissent, was essentially of the view that it was not the place of the court to import 
into the law a requirement for all indigent accused to be afforded representation at 
state expense.
345
 Such concerns were largely echoed the dissenting opinion of 
Dawson J.
346
 
Chief Justice Mason, McHugh, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that there is no 
general right to representation at state expense. However, it was held that if an 
indigent accused who is charged with a serious criminal offence cannot obtain legal 
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representation through no fault of their own, the trial should be stayed or adjourned 
until representation can be obtained.
347
 Further in the event that such an application 
is refused and the trial is an unfair one, any conviction cannot stand for ‘there has 
been a miscarriage of justice in that the accused has been convicted without a fair 
trial’.348 Accordingly, it was held that a Court has an inherent power to stay a trial in 
circumstances where the trial would be unfair.
349
  
Justices Deane and Gaudron JJ went further and held that the right to a fair trial was 
implied from the separation of judicial power in Chapter III of the Constitution.
350
 
Justice Deane held that the right to a fair trial is a ‘fundamental prescript’ of the 
criminal law which is implied in Chapter III.
351
 His Honour held that the separation 
of Commonwealth judicial power in Chapter III implies that such power be exercised 
pursuant to the law to effect a fair trial.
352
  Justice Gaudron held that the right to a 
fair trial is implied from the Constitution which requires the concomitant exercise of 
judicial power with judicial process.
353
  Her Honour held that the ‘requirement that a 
trial be fair is not one that impinges on the substantive law…’ but only on 
‘evidentiary and procedural rules’.354 
Professor Wheeler points out that while both Deane and Gaudron JJ clearly held that 
there was a connection between due process and the right to a fair trial, their Honours 
did not comment further on the nature of this connection.
355
 Read in light of the 
entire case however, the principle that can be gleaned is that Deane and Gaudron JJ 
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regard that the power of the Court to prevent an abuse of process resulting in an 
unfair trial through a stay of proceedings as a fundamental aspect of judicial 
power.
356
 Accordingly, if the legislature took this power away from the Court, then 
Dietrich would have to be tried through an unfair use of judicial power. This, 
according to Deane and Gardron JJ would be contrary to Chapter III.
357
  
 The Kable Principle, the expansion of judicial power and the right to a fair B
trial 
This implication of the right to a fair trial from chapter III has, arguably, been 
strengthened through the expansion of judicial power.  It has been seen that the right 
to a fair trial is made up of number of rights whose content cannot be exhaustively 
defined. However, Mason CJ and McHugh J have noted that broadly speaking, 
conventions such as the ICCPR provide guidance as to the content of the right.
358
 A 
common feature amongst these instruments is that they recognise that a fundamental 
element of the right to a fair trial is the entrenchment of a ‘fair and public hearing by 
a competent, independent and impartial tribunal’.359    
Thus as the right to an independent and impartial judiciary represents the core of the 
right to a fair trial it can be suggested that the right to a fair trial has been 
strengthened as a consequence of the expansion of judicial power as embodied in 
Chapter III.   
                                                          
356
 Ibid 266. 
357
 Ibid. 
358
 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 300; See also McHugh, Does Chapter III of the 
Constitution Protect substantive as well as procedural rights?’, above n 230, 241; There is also a  
longstanding presumption that legislation is to be read consistently with international law See Mabo v 
Queensland (No2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42 (Brennan J); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v 
Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 , 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J) 
359
 ICCPR art 14(1); ECHR art 6(1) ; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006(Vic) s 
24(1); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 21(1); The point is best expressed in Millar v Dickson [2002] 
1 WLR 1615, 1628 where Lord Bingham notes  that the right to an independent and impartial 
judiciary as expressed in the ECHR ‘ is a safeguard which should , least of all in the criminal field, be 
weakened or diluted, whatever the administrative consequences’ 
54 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers was expanded in Kable which established that 
the separation of judicial power applies to state courts.
360
  In a nutshell, the Court in 
Kable held that because they exercise commonwealth judicial power; state legislative 
bodies cannot confer power so as to impugn the ‘institutional integrity’ of courts.361  
Second, where a state court exercises federal judicial power, that court must be 
independent and impartial (‘the Kable Principle’).362 
In recent years, the High Court has been vigilant in protecting courts which 
administer federal judicial power as the ‘Constitution does not permit different 
grades or qualities of justice’.363  First, in International Finance Trust,364 the Court 
held invalid a provision which effectively removed the discretion of the Court in the 
making of a restraining order.
365
 A majority held that this provision would result in a 
court engaging ‘in activity which is repugnant to the judicial process in a 
fundamental degree’.366  In South Australia v Totani,367 the Serious and Organised 
Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) provided that if the Police Commissioner applies to 
the Magistrates Court, that Court must make a control order against that person if it 
finds that he or she is part of a ‘declared organisation’.368 The High Court held that 
this provision was an impermissible interference by the executive which impugns the 
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appearance of independence and impartiality and this thus constitutionally invalid.
369
 
Essentially, the legislation was invalid as it rendered ‘the Court an instrument of the 
Executive’.370 Thereafter in Wainohu,371 the High Court declared invalid, a provision 
which allowed a judge to declare an organisation a ‘declared organisation’.372 This 
was because that provision did not require reasons for such a decision, and, as a 
result, it was inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power.
373
    
Indeed whether or not a legislative provision impugns the exercise of judicial power 
would depend on, inter alia, ‘evaluative judgements’ which cannot accurately 
defined.
374
 If such a judgement is in conflict with a legislative provision of a state 
then the power of that state is limited accordingly.
375
 In this vein, Professor Gray 
argues that although it is not express in the reasoning adopted by the court in the 
preceding cases, it is clear that in applying the Kable Principle, the Court has adhered 
to the concept of a fair trial as expressed in Dietrich.
376
 In other words, ‘the result 
and the reasoning is similar to what would have occurred if the Dietrich notion of a 
fair trial had been applied’.377 And in this sense, the right to a fair trial remains a 
constitutional right. 
The extension and ambiguity of the separation of powers doctrine to the States and 
its vigilant enforcement by the High Court has in turn bolstered the right to a fair trial 
by strengthening the right to an independent and impartial judiciary.
378
  As Professor 
Bagaric notes, the development of the Kable Principle has highlighted that 
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legislatures cannot ‘summarily and wantonly violate important individual rights 
without due process’.379  
 The ‘constitutional right to a fair trial’? C
However, as the right to a fair trial is comprised of a number of rights, there are 
certain hurdles which the ‘constitutionally entrenched right to a fair trial’ must 
overcome in order for its existence to be firmly established.  
The central issues, is it argued, revolve around two characteristics of the right as 
explained above. First, the right to a fair trial is comprised of a number of rights, not 
all of which are constitutionally protected in their fullest sense.  Second, the right to a 
fair trial cannot be confined only to the trial. It extends throughout the criminal 
process from investigation to appeal.
380
 
 Right to examine witnesses not constitutionally protected  1
It is expressed in a number of human rights instruments that a key fair trial right is 
the right to examine witnesses.
381
 Accordingly, the argument that the right to a fair 
trial is not constitutionally protected in the full sense of the term is strengthened by 
the approach of the High Court in Assistant Commissioner Cordon v Pompano 
(‘Pompano’).382 In this case, the Court considered certain provisions of the Criminal 
Organisation Act 2009 Act (Qld) (‘the COA Act’) in relation to the making of a 
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declaration that an organisation is a ‘criminal organisation’.383 The applicant (the 
Assistant Police Commissioner) must provide supporting information such as 
‘criminal intelligence’ in order for a court to make such a declaration.384 However, 
the ‘criminal intelligence’ cannot be adduced in court by the informant.385 Further, 
the respondents were barred from being present when the Court was considering 
issues of ‘criminal intelligence’.386  In short, the COA Act allowed ‘for closed 
hearings and the use of secret evidence’ known only to the State.387 
The respondents argued that the ‘institutional integrity’ of the Court was impugned 
because the COA Act allowed the Court to receive information which cannot be 
disclosed to them.
388
 The Court unanimously held that because the Supreme Court 
has the power to control its processes and act ‘fairly and impartially’ the provisions 
of the COA Act were valid.
389
 In contrast to Wainohu it was held that the COA Act 
does not limit the Courts discretion to prevent unfairness.
390
  
Although holding the provisions valid, Gageler J noted that because a respondent 
would not be able to respond to the evidence, ‘[i]t is not difficult to see how 
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the informant is accurate.  
386
 Ibid s 78. This section provides that ‘[t]he court must order any part of the hearing of the 
substantive application in which the declared criminal intelligence is to be considered (the relevant 
part) to be a closed hearing’. 
387
 Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638, 641 [4] 
(French CJ). 
388
  Ibid 667 [97] (Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ). 
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  Ibid 665 -6 [88-9] ( French CJ), 682-4 [160- 69] , 686 [177-8] (Gageler J) Justices Hayne Crennan 
Keifel and Bell also held that while the means through which the commissioner intends to prove the 
allegation is not known, the respondent is aware of ‘ what is the allegation that is made against it’: at 
683 [163] (emphasis in original).  
390
 Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638, 
684[168] (Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell) 684 [167]. As Gageler J held  ‘The criminal intelligence 
provisions are saved from incompatibility with Ch III of the Constitution only by the capacity for the 
Supreme Court of Queensland to stay a substantive application in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction 
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unfairness…might arise’.391 Indeed, the use of such evidence, which cannot be tested 
through cross examination, is contrary to the fair trial on a number of levels.
392
 The 
most apparent danger is that the reception of such evidence has the potential to 
‘positively mislead’.393 And it is due to this risk that the right to challenge evidence 
‘occupies such a central place in the concept of the fair trial’.394  
It may be suggested that although the Kable Principle has strengthened the notion of 
an independent and impartial judiciary, its boundaries remain unclear. While this 
ambiguity may serve to protect rights in some cases, it is difficult to reconcile any 
‘constitutional right to a fair trial’ in the absence of a constitutional right to confront 
witnesses.  
 The inadmissibility of fresh evidence on appeal- limiting the right to a fair trial 2
A number of human rights instruments also provide that an element of the fair trial is 
a right to the review of a conviction.
395
 Therefore, while Chapter III entrenches and 
independent and impartial judiciary, it does not fully protect the right to a fair trial as 
it limits the accused rights of appeal. This is evinced by the High Court’s 
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cited in Mike Redmayne, Confronting Confrontation in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter (eds) Criminal 
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interpretation of s 73 which does not allow for highly probative evidence to have an 
effect on the accuracy of the verdict. 
Section 73 of the Constitution establishes the High Court on the summit of the 
Australian judicial hierarchy. Notwithstanding certain exceptions, s 73 secures the 
right to appeal to the High Court from the ‘judgements, decrees, orders and 
sentences’ of various courts.396  
In Mickelberg, it was held that s73 precluded fresh evidence from being received on 
appeal.
397
 This interpretation was expanded in Eastman.
398
  In that case, it was held 
that fresh evidence could not be  received from Federal Courts and Courts exercising 
federal jurisdiction as the ‘appeals’ in s 73  were intended to apply ‘regardless of the 
identity of the particular court’. 399 
As French CJ has summarised, the reason for the Court’s reluctance to receive fresh 
evidence on appeal stem from; first, the fact that as a matter of history, the grant of 
appellate jurisdiction to the High Court at federation did not encompass the 
understanding that such jurisdiction allowed the reception of fresh evidence.
400
 
Second, as aforementioned, the reception of fresh evidence is inconsistent with the 
position of the High Court at the apex of the Australian judicial system.
401
  
A broader interpretation of s 73 was advocated by Kirby J’s dissent in Eastman.402 
His Honour observed that in 1900, the words ‘jury trial’ in s 80 reflected a jury of 
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 Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259, 266-9 where Mason CJ observed ‘Over the years 
this Court has consistently maintained that it has no power to receive fresh evidence in the exercise of 
its appellate jurisdiction’. Justices Toohey and Gaudron agreed: at 298  
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 Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1. 
399
  Ibid 63 [190] (Gummow J). 
400
 Clodumar v Nauru Lands Committee (2012) 288 ALR 208, 215. In this case, the High Court found 
that fresh evidence may be admitted  in the High Court under s 5 of the Nauru (High Court Appeals) 
Act 1976 (Cth). 
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402
 Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1, 79-80 [240-44] cited in Bibi Sangha and Robert Moles, 
Post- appeal review rights: Australia, Britain and Canada (2012) 36 Criminal Law Journal 300,309. 
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men only. The High Court excluded such elements from the law passed down from 
England. Consequently, his Honour questions why the interpretation of the word 
‘appeal’ is restricted but ‘jury’ is not.403  
‘Fresh evidence’ is evidence is evidence that was not available at the time of the trial 
but arose subsequent to proceedings.
404
 The criminal trial is not perfect and 
miscarriages of justice sometimes occur for a variety of reasons.
405
  In some cases, 
relevant and probative evidence may arise after the appeal processes.
406
  Generally 
speaking, if an accused is convicted, an appeal may be brought to the court of 
appeal.
407
 However, as Sangha, Roach and Moles point out, in Australia, there are 
limited post appeal review rights.
408
 For one, as explained above, the High Court 
cannot receive fresh evidence on appeal. Thus even if probative evidence of 
innocence is available, it cannot be received in the High Court.
409
 Application of this 
rule may entail that in certain circumstances, the High Court is not able to receive 
fresh evidence discovered after the trial ‘whatever the reason and however justifiable 
the delay’.410 This is contrary to justice.411 
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The potential for this to result in an unfair trial is best illustrated in Stuart v The 
Queen.
412
 Stuart, an illiterate Aboriginal Australian man, was convicted of the rape 
and murder of a nine year old girl and sentenced to death. In his appeal to the High 
Court, he argued, that expert evidence regarding the fact that the alleged confession 
was typed in language which he could not possibly have dictated or understood, 
should be received.
413
 The Court was however, ‘confined on appeal to the material 
which was before the Court appealed from’.414 Indeed, Stuart is not the only instance 
where application of this rule has resulted in unfairness.
415
  
It is recognised that courts below the High Court may receive fresh evidence.
416
 
Further, there are arguments that an expansive review of post appeal review rights 
might work to extend the trial process depriving victims of closure.
417
 While these 
considerations carry much weight, the fact remains that in some cases, s 73 of the 
Constitution has operated inconsistently with the right to a fair trial.  
  Conclusions D
Fundamentally, the challenge with implying the right to a fair trial (in its full sense) 
in the Constitution is that its primary purpose was not as instrument of rights 
protection such as the Charter or HRA.
418
 There are a number of observations that 
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414
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support this point.
419
 First, the architects of the Constitution were primarily 
concerned with building a federation and not protecting rights.
420
 Second, the 
architects of the Constitution firmly believed in the common law as a vehicle of 
rights protection.
421
 This is clearly evinced by the express rejection of an American 
style due process clause in the Constitution.
422
 Third, at the time of federation, there 
was much intellectual animosity toward fundamental human rights led by the work 
of Bentham.
423
 
The right to a fair trial was held to be a necessary implication from the vesting of an 
independent and impartial judiciary in Chapter III of the Constitution. However, it is 
difficult to reconcile any ‘constitutional right to a fair trial’ with the interpretation of 
s 73 and the absence of other key fair trial rights. These examples highlight that the 
constitutional protection of the right to a fair trial under the Constitution is not 
protected in the full sense of the term.
424
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V THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS 
 Objectives of the Criminal Process- Factual Accuracy of the Verdict A
The preceding analysis has focused on the strength of the protections given to the 
right to a fair trial as a human right. As noted above, this is important as breaches of 
fair trial standards are wrong per se in light of the position of the criminal trial as 
regulating the exercise of the power by the state.
425
 This wrong, is divorced from 
considerations of whether the verdict of the trial is factually correct, as any breach of 
fair trial standards detracts the rights all citizens have for liberty and equal 
treatment.
426
  
However, as alluded to in the analysis of s 73 of the Constitution, this presents only 
one part of the fair trial. In Stuart, the accused was denied a fair trial but not because 
of a breach of his due process rights. Indeed his trial was, ‘a trial according to 
law’.427 Simply, his trial was unfair because he was convicted despite his innocence.  
As Professor Dennis explains, the right to a fair trial has both a truth seeking and 
right protecting function. To be conferred legitimacy, the verdict of the trial must 
‘carry moral authority’ though protecting rights and also be factually correct.428 This 
is because the right not to be wrongly convicted is ‘even more basic than the vaunted 
right to a fair trial’.429 The fact that rights take precedence over factual accuracy in 
                                                          
425
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some cases simply illustrates the fact that sometimes, rights have a greater value than 
the truth.
430
 
The relationship between a factually accurate verdict and the right to a fair trial was 
best expressed by Gaudron J in Dietrich where her Honour held: ‘A trial is not 
necessarily unfair because it is less than perfect, but it is unfair if it involves a risk of 
the accused being improperly convicted.’431 Therefore, the proper purpose for the 
criminal trial is to determine whether the accused is criminally responsible.
432
   
However, certain practices limit the factual accuracy of the verdict. As Nobels and 
Schiff note, the truth seeking function of the criminal trial  
is its strength , in terms of the law’s claim to legitimacy, and a weakness , as a 
source of endless critique on the manner in which trial falls below science or even 
journalism as a method for establishing truth.
433
 
 
The remainder of this paper considers the critique of the criminal trial and its ability 
to determine the truth. It will be argued that as the criminal trial is directed toward 
achieving a factually accurate verdict, the right to a fair trial is lost where the 
admission of certain evidence detracts from this goal. This point will be illustrated 
through an analysis of expert evidence in criminal trials.
434
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First, this chapter discusses the important contributions that scientific evidence 
provides to the administration of justice.
435
 Thereafter, it argues that the law 
governing the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal trials must be directed to 
be consistent with the goal of the criminal process in seeking a factually accurate 
verdict.
436
 In order to achieve the goal of factual accuracy, expert evidence which is 
unreliable or of unknown reliability should not be admitted.
437
 This is because the 
specific nature of this evidence makes it difficult for the finder of fact to be made 
fully aware of its shortcomings. Equally, where reliable expert opinion exists to 
explain the unreliability of evidence, it is important that such expert evidence be 
admitted so as to avoid miscarriages of justice. This reflects the most important 
characteristic of the fair trial which is its ability to adapt and evolve in line with 
societal and technological advancements.
438
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 Scientific research as informing the fair trial B
The law has adopted practices which seek to ascertain the truth and it is only natural 
that reliable scientific knowledge supports this objective.
439
 As will be seen 
throughout this discussion, the legal system relies heavily on the sciences, in 
particular forensic sciences, for the determination of guilt or innocence.
440
  
For instance, it has been suggested that advances in neuroscience may have an 
impact on, inter alia, the law relating to criminal offences with an element of intent 
(or mens rea), provocation as a defence,
441
 strict liability offences, and bias in 
decision making by judges or juries.
442
  This potential is however, contingent upon 
the willingness of courts to remain receptive to empirical evidence in informing and 
directing the right to a fair trial. This is clear in contrasting the approach of the High 
Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of New Jersey in two recent cases.  
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 Dupas v The Queen 1
First, in Dupas v The Queen,
443
 the High Court had to decide whether pre-trial 
publicity tainted the tribunal of fact, so as to deny the accused a fair trial.
444
 The 
appellant, Peter Dupas,
445
 had been convicted for two murders prior to the trial. 
These murders were publicised in over 120 newspaper articles, 7 internet sites and 4 
books.
446
 He argued that adverse pre-trial publicity conferred an ‘irremediable 
prejudice’ on the jury which precluded him from a fair trial.447 In a unanimous 
judgement, the Court emphasised its power to order a permanent stay of proceedings 
on the ground of an ‘irremediable prejudice to a fair trial’.448 The Court held that the 
‘public interest in the administration of justice’, and the continuance of public 
confidence in the judiciary, were key considerations in the determination of an abuse 
of process.
449
 It was held that the directions given by the trial judge to the jury in this 
case balanced any unfairness arising from pre-trial publicity.
450
 
On its face, the Court’s reasoning is uncontroversial and consistent with the 
characteristics of the right to a fair trial, as outlined above. The public interest of an 
accused person with significant media exposure being brought to trial was 
considered, and it was concluded that allowing the trial to proceed was fair.
451
 The 
fair trial must balance the rights of all parties involved. It necessitates, among other 
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things, consideration of the ‘social imperative’452 of bringing to trial those who are 
accused of a criminal offence to trial.
453
  
However, the High Court did not make clear why jury directions were able to cure 
the adverse publicity.
454
 This is despite the fact that whether the publicity had an 
effect on the jury and, whether the directions mitigated its effect were the key issues 
before the court.
455
  
Indeed, empirical research has suggested that jury directions are ineffective in curing 
unfairness arising from pre-trial publicity.
456
 Further, jurors are likely to be most 
prejudiced when subjected to both television and print media as was the case in 
Dupas.
457
  In an analysis of 44 relevant studies it was determined that such publicity 
had a negative effect on the verdict at trial.
458
 Also, these issues sit on top of 
deficiencies in relation to jury directions such as the fact that juries often do not 
follow such directions.
459
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459
 See Huruna v The Queen [2013] WASCA 170 (1 August 2013) where the jury foreperson, a law 
student, communicated with a State solicitor in relation to issues at trial in disregard of jury directions. 
See also Roxanne Burd and Jacueline Horan, ‘Protecting the right to a fair trial in the 21st Century- 
has trial by jury been caught in the world wide web’ (2012) 36 Criminal Law Journal 103.112-17; See 
also Mark Weinberg, ‘The Criminal Law- A ‘Mildly Vituperative Critique’’ (2011) 35 Melbourne 
University Law Review 1177, 1191-5 where his Honour notes the practical difficulties in relation to 
jury directions. This includes the fact that directions may take hours and that they are often ‘couched 
in language that almost defies understanding’: at 1193; Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘Making it 
Easier for Juries to be the Deciders of Fact’ (Paper presented at the AIJA Criminal Justice in Australia 
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This body of research would have assisted the court in the determination of why, in 
the circumstances of Dupas, jury directions were able to cure any unfairness.
460
  In 
this regard, Bagaric has argued that ‘the irreducible aspect is that human cognition is 
a science’ and evidence should have been adduced to determine the effect of the 
publicity on the accuracy of the verdict. 
461
 
The intention of this point is not to criticise the Court. Indeed, the High Court was 
under no obligation to consider such empirical findings.
462
 Further, it is likely that in 
any event, fairness necessitated that the interests of society take precedence over the 
right of Peter Dupas to an impartial tribunal. The aim of this analysis is simply to 
highlight the potential of science to explain and inform the direction of the law in 
relation to the fair trial.
463
 
 State v Henderson 2
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in the United States has recently taken advantage 
of this potential in its response to ‘hundreds of scientific studies…which cast doubt 
on well settled law’.464  In State v Henderson, 465 Henderson was charged with the 
murder of Rodney Harper. James Womble, who was intoxicated at the time,
466
 heard 
the shooting while being held at gunpoint near where the shooting occurred.  During 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and New Zealand – Issues and Challenges for Judicial Administration, Sydney, 8 September 2011) 1-
5. 
460
 Mirko Bagaric, ‘Fair Trial and Prejudicial (Social) Media Comment- The Problem is not Social 
Media but the Existing Law’ (2012) 36 Criminal Law Journal 333, 333. 
461
 Bagaric, ‘The Right to an Impartial Hearing’, above n 214, 352. 
462
 This is especially as there has been some controversy on the accuracy of such empirical findings. 
Among other things, the methodology of such studies have been criticised See Andreas Kapardis, 
Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 3
rd
, 2010) 169.  
463
 See Stephen Gageler, Fact and Law (2008-2009) 11 Newcastle Law Review 1, 8-10 Where the 
author notes a number of High Court authorities which used extra-legal sources to guide their 
decision.  These include; Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay- Roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 
CLR 120; Secretary Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case) 
(1992) 175 CLR 218; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; See also Winmar v Western Australia 
(2007) 35 WAR 159 where the Supreme Court of Western Australia referred to numerous 
psychological materials in relation to eyewitness identification evidence.  
464
 Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, ‘Evaluating Eyewitness Identification Evidence in the 21st Century’ 
(2012) 87 (5) New York University Law Review 1249, 1250. 
465
 State v Henderson 27 A. 3d 872 (NJ, 2011). 
466
 Ibid 882 He had ingested crack cocaine and alcohol. 
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investigation the police presented Womble with a number of photographs and 
Henderson was identified as the perpetrator. However, it was found that the police 
had encouraged him to do so. 
467
 The trial court had previously admitted Womble’s 
identification evidence pursuant to the ‘Manson/ Madison’ test.468 The Supreme 
Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine validity of this test ‘in light of 
recent scientific and other evidence’.469 After an exhaustive review of the scientific 
commentary, the Supreme Court determined that the ‘Manson / Madison’ test be 
altered.
470
  
Importantly, the Court took into consideration the fact that any changes to the status 
quo must  
be flexible enough to serve twin aims: to guarantee fair trials to defendants, who 
must have the tools necessary to defend themselves, and to protect the State's interest 
in presenting critical evidence at trial.
471
 
The Court outlined a non-exhaustive list of considerations in relation to ‘estimator 
variables’ and ‘system variables’ which should be taken into account in determining 
the admissibility of eyewitness evidence.
472
 While noting that courts should not be 
constrained by these guidelines, it was made clear that any potential changes to 
police investigation or admissibility of such evidence must be drawn from ‘reliable 
                                                          
467
 Ibid 881 Womble subsequently testified that the detective was ‘‘nudging’ him to choose the 
defendant’s photo, and that there was pressure to make a choice’. 
468
 In Manson v Brathwaite 432 US 98 (1977) the US Supreme Court expressed a two stage test in 
relation to assessing eyewitness evidence. This was affirmed in New Jersey in State v Madison 536 
A.2d 254 (NJ, 1988) See Chief Justice Rabner, above n 464, 1253-4. 
469
 State v Henderson 27 A. 3d 872, 884 (NJ, 2011). 
470
 Ibid 878 The Court noted that the ‘Manson/ Madison [test] does not adequately meet its stated 
goals: it does not provide a sufficient measure of reliability, it does not deter, and it overstates the 
jury’s innate ability to evaluate eyewitness testimony’: at 918. 
471
 State v Henderson 27 A. 3d 872, 922 (NJ, 2011). 
472
 Ibid 920-2 The court expressed a list of 9 ‘system variables’ and 13 estimator variables which 
should be taken into account. System variables refer to things that can be controlled such as line-up 
processes. Estimator variables refer to things that beyond control such as when, where and the 
conditions under which the witness saw the incident; at 895; See Gary L Wells ‘Applied Eyewitness- 
Testimony Research: System variables and estimator variables (1987) 36 (12) Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 1546. As to system and estimator variables generally.  
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scientific evidence’.473 The Court held that this flexibility would secure the right to a 
fair trial for the accused and also assist the prosecution of criminals.
474
 Thus in 
informing the right to a fair trial, the court considered the scientific evidence and 
balanced the interests of society in the conviction of criminals with practical 
considerations of the criminal justice system. 
While this case can be distinguished from Dupas as the scientific evidence in relation 
to the unreliability of eyewitness evidence is more established than that in relation to 
jury bias,
475
 it illustrates that scientific evidence can  guide the right to a fair trial. As 
Henderson demonstrates, scientific evidence can be integrated into the criminal 
justice system. A balance with competing interests and the practicalities of the justice 
system to direct the development of the right to a fair trial is indeed possible.  
 Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials- An Overview C
 Admissibility of expert evidence 1
(a) The Opinion Rule 
The ability for scientific evidence to inform and direct the fair trial is contingent 
however, on the means through which such scientific evidence is brought to the 
attention of the court. In our adversarial system, facts are ascertained by the tribunal 
of fact through two broad ways. Facts may come into the court by way of testimony 
or by way of real evidence which the tribunal of fact can experience themselves.  In 
any case, it will be necessary for a witness to testify in order to bring any real 
evidence into issue.
476
 A lay witness cannot however, express their evidence as an 
                                                          
473
 State v Henderson 27 A. 3d 872, 922 (NJ, 2011). 
474
 Ibid 928. 
475
 See Kapardis, above n 462, 28-9; For example, in 1995 there were more than 2000 academic 
publications in psychology relating to the reliability of eyewitness evidence. This is as eyewitness 
evidence involves numerous psychological and cognitive processes. 
476
 Ligertwood and Edmond, Australian Evidence, above n 205, 575.  
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opinion (the ‘opinion rule’).477  To do so would be to subvert the role of the tribunal 
of fact in the determination of facts or inferences.
478
 However, this cannot be ‘a strict 
or hard and fast rule without…impairing the judicial process’.479 Accordingly, a 
witness may express an opinion as to their observations.
480
 There are however, cases 
where expertise is required to make certain observations such as the probability of a 
given DNA sample matching another.
481
 In other words, an opinion is admissible if it 
‘so far partakes of the nature of science as to require a course of previous habit or 
study in order to make knowledge of it’.482 
(b) Rules of admissibility   
 In order for such an opinion to be admissible, a number of formal rules must be 
satisfied.
483
 First, as the expert opinion must ‘be able to assist’ the tribunal of fact in 
the determination of the facts in issue (the ‘common knowledge rule’).484 This rule 
seeks to preclude evidence which is regular and familiar to the jury.
485
 Second, the 
evidence must constitute ‘part of a body of knowledge or experience which is 
sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge 
or experience’ 486 (the ‘field of expertise rule’). Third, the witness must be an expert 
                                                          
477
 See Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76; It is recognized that separation between fact and opinions is not 
always clear See Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588, 602  [31]. 
478
  Ligertwood and Edmond, Australian Evidence, above n 205, 603. 
479
 Sherrard v Jacob [1965] NI 151, 156 (Lord Mac Dermott LCJ) citied in Grubisic v Western 
Australia (2011) A Crim R 457, 466-7.   
480
 Sherrard v Jacob [1965] NI 151, 156 (Lord Mac Dermott LCJ) where a non-exhaustive list of lay 
opinion evidence that are admissible. These areas include; 1) identification of handwriting , persons 
and things, 2) apparent age 3) the bodily plight or condition of a person including death or illness 4) 
the emotional state of a person 5) the condition of things 6) questions of value 7) estimates of speed or 
distance; Ligertwood and Edmond, Australian Evidence,  above n 205, 605-6;  See Freckelton and 
Selby, above n 434, 30 [ 2.5.10].   
481
 See generally Freckelton and Selby, above n 434, 1135-97 as to DNA evidence. 
482
 Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486, 491 (Dixon J) This applies to the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79. 
483
 See Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, 743-4 ( Heydon JA). 
484
 Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94, 110 (Mason and Toohey JJ) 126 (Deane J), 130 
(Dawson J);  R v Truner [1975] QB 834, 841 ‘ An experts opinion is admissible to furnish the court 
with scientific information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the judge  or 
jury’.  
485
 Heydon , above n 73, 956 [29050]. 
486
 R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 46-7 (King CJ). 
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and not a ‘quack, a charlatan or an enthusiastic amateur’487 (the ‘expertise rule’). The 
expertise of the witness need not necessarily derive from study or training but may 
be a result of practical experience.
488
 Fourth, the testimony of the expert must be 
based on admissible evidence (the basis rule).
489
  
The provisions of the Evidence Act are akin to the common law rules of 
admissibility.
490
 First, the expert must have ‘specialised knowledge’.491 The opinion 
of the expert must then be based ‘wholly or substantially’ on such specialised 
knowledge.
492
   
 Admissibility and reliability 2
As will be explained below, the continued significance of the right to a fair trial 
requires the underlying basis of the expert’s testimony be reliable. The term ‘reliable’ 
has a different meaning in a legal sense than it is used in a scientific context.
493
 In 
essence, a scientific technique is reliable if it has been subject to empirical testing.
494
 
In other words, ‘[t]he more rigorous the testing, the more likely any results will be 
trustworthy’.495 
                                                          
487
 R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161, 166. 
488
 Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436. 
489
 Dasreef v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588, 605 This pertains to the admissibility of the evidence and 
not its weight; But see Gary Edmond et al, ‘Admissibility Compared: The Reception of Incriminating 
Expert Evidence (I.E Forensic Science) in Four Adversarial Jurisdictions’ (2013) 3 University of 
Denver Criminal Law Review 31, 79; Gary Edmond, ‘Actual ‘Innocents? Legal limitations and their 
implications for forensic science and medicine’ (2011) 43 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 
177,182-3 where it has been argued that in practise, the basis rule is often glossed over. 
490
 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 60, 76, 79, 80, 177. 
491
 Ibid s 79(1). 
492
 Ibid. 
493
 Emma Cunliffee, Independence, reliability and expert testimony in criminal trials (2013) 45(3) 
Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 284, 286-7. The legal use of the term reliability is akin to the 
scientific use of the term ‘validity’ In sum, a scientific test is reliable if  ; a) it  can achieve what it 
asserts it can achieve 2) the ability to apply the techniques 3) the extent to which such techniques have 
been applied properly in the specific circumstances; See also Ray Corsini, The Dictionary of 
Psychology (Brunner-Routeledge, 2002) 1044 the validity of a test is ‘the ability of a test to measure 
what it is supposed to measure’ 
494
 Edmond, ‘Pathological Science?’ above n 437, 31-42. 
495
 Ibid 43-5 where Professor Edmond outlines numerous ‘indicia of reliability’. 
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As noted above, in Australia, the issue of whether novel scientific evidence is 
admissible turns on whether such evidence ‘is sufficiently organised or recognised as 
a reliable body of knowledge or experience’.496 Thus if novel scientific or expert 
evidence is to be admitted, the court will determine whether the community of 
experts in that field are of the view that such evidence is reliable.
497
 Although this 
requires a minimum standard of reliability, courts have had difficulty with this 
standard.
498
   
Australian courts have shown a general reluctance to expressly incorporate reliability 
into admissibility standards.
499
 The concept of reliability is also absent from the 
words of s 79 of the Evidence Act. Thus in R v Tang,
500
 Spigelman CJ held that in 
relation to the requirement for ‘specialised knowledge’ under the Evidence Act 1995 
(NSW), it is the words of the Act that require attention not ‘extraneous ideas of 
reliability’.501   
The Australian position reflects the approach adopted in Frye v United States.
502
  In 
that case, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia had to determine the 
admissibility of the results of an early polygraph machine.
503
 It was held that the 
admissibility of novel scientific evidence is contingent on whether that evidence  is 
‘sufficiently established  to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
                                                          
496
 R v Bonython (1984) 15 A Crim R 364, 366 (King CJ); Casley – Smith v Fs Evans & Sons  Pty Ltd 
and District Council of Sterling (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 , 328 (OlssonJ); R v Harris (No3) [1990] 
VR 310, 318 (Ormiston J); See Heydon, above n 73, 962 
497
 Casley-Smith v F S Evans & Sons Pty Ltd and District Council of Sterling (No1) (1988) 49 SASR 
314, 328-9 (OlssonJ) citied in Freckelton and Selby, above n 434, 63 ; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 
486, 491 ( Dixon J) 
498
 Ligertwood and Edmond, Australian Evidence, above n 205, 615-17. 
499
 See HG  v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414, 427 ( Gleeson CJ) ;  R v McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311 
(11 April 2001), [14] (Bell J); Amaba Pty Ltd v Booth [2010] NSWCA 344( 10 December 2010) [57] 
(Basten JA) 
500
 R v Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377 
501
 R v Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377, 409 [137];  See also Australian Law Reform Commission ,  
Uniform Evidence Law , Report No 102 (2005) 290 
502
 Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir, 1923); Freckelton and Selby, above n 434, 66 
[2.10.180]; Heydon, above n 73, 962; See also R v Parker [1912] VR 152, 154-5. 
503
 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579, 585 (Blackmun J) (1993); See James 
Edelman, Admissibility of polygraph (lie detector) examinations (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 21 
as to the admissibility of ‘lie detector’ evidence in Australia. 
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which it belongs’ (the ‘general acceptance test’).504 Notably, this approach does not 
specifically necessitate that such evidence be reliable and its focus is on the extent to 
which such a technique is accepted within the relevant community of scientists.
505
 
In contrast to this position is the prevailing United States approach expressed in 
Daubert v Merell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
506
 In that case, the United States Supreme 
Court held that that in order for scientific opinion evidence be of assistance to the 
finder of fact it must follow that such evidence be grounded upon ‘a reliable basis in 
the knowledge and experience’ of the relevant field of science.507 Thus the test for 
admissibility is twofold. First, the evidence must be relevant and second, it must be 
reliable.
508
 The Court then expressed a list of non-exhaustive ‘general observations’ 
to consider in determining reliability.
509
  Subsequent cases have expanded the scope 
of Daubert which initially applied only to scientific evidence.
510
 Indeed, the 
requirement for reliability has been given statutory force.
511
  
 
 
                                                          
504
 Frye v United States 293 F 1013, 1014 (DC Cir, 1923) citied in Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579, 586 (Blackmun J) (1993). 
505
 See Freckelton and Selby, above n 434, 64-6; Heydon, above n 73, 962-3. 
506
 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579 (1993) This approach has been accepted in 
29 states and the federal court system.  It is often called the ‘reliability- validity’ model; Gary Edmond 
et al, ‘Admissibility Compared’ above n 489, 38-9. 
507
 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579, 592 (Blackmun J) (1993). 
508
 See Gary Edmond et al, ‘Admissibility Compared’ above n 489, 39-40;  
509
 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579, 593-5 (Blackmun J) (1993) These include; 
inquiries into whether it can be tested, if it has been peer reviewed, error rates and if it has been 
generally accepted by the relevant community of experts. 
510
 See General Electric Co v Joiner 522 US 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co Ltd v Carmichael 526 US 
137 (1999) where the principles in Daubert were extended to apply to other forms of expert testimony 
such as engineers.; See also United States v Havvard   260 F.3d 597 (7
th
 Cir, 2001); United States v 
Plaza F Supp 2d 549 (ED PA, 2002); Megan Dillhoff, ‘Science , Law and Truth: Defining the Scope 
of the Daubert Trilogy’ (2011) 86 Notre Dame Law Review 1289, 1295-99 
511
 Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 USC App § 702 (2011) which provides that “A witness who is 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise if (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is 
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
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 Admissibility of expert testimony and the goal of factual accuracy D
On the one hand, expert evidence often plays an important role in assisting the court 
in the determination of the facts in issue.
512
 For example, expert opinion evidence is 
adduced to assist the court in establishing, amongst other things; causation in relation 
to an injury,
513
 psychiatric or mental injuries,
514
 memory,
515
 a mental state,
516
   dental 
impression or bite-mark evidence,
517
 DNA evidence,
518
 whether fingerprints 
match,
519
 and in drug offences.
520
  
On the other, it is critical that only expert evidence which is relevant and reliable be 
adduced in a way that can be understood by the tribunal of fact. To be consistent with 
the goal of the criminal trial in producing a factually accurate verdict, the right to a 
fair trial must operate to preclude the admission of scientific evidence the reliability 
of which is either questionable or unknown.
521
  Equally, it is important that the right 
to a fair trial ensure that scientific evidence which is probative and reliable be 
admitted.  It is argued that it is within this scope where the right to a fair trial must 
                                                          
512
 Chicago Colledge of Osteopathic Medicine v George A Fuller Co 801 F 2d 908, 911 (7
th
 Cir, 1986) 
Where Posner J has noted that ‘in a great deal of complex litigation…expert testimony is a practical if 
not legal necessity’ citied in Heydon, above n 73, 953. 
513
 See, eg, Seltsam Pty Ltd v Mc Guinness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262. The evidence of medical 
professionals are the most common form of expert evidence adduced in trials. See Freckelton and 
Selby, above n 434, 567 [ 9.5.01] 
514
 See, eg, Tame v New South Wales; Annettes v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
Expert evidence is important as a person seeking to recover damages for pure mental harm under the 
various Civil Liability Acts cannot do so unless such an injury is a ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ See 
Civil Liability Act 2002(WA) s 5S (1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 31, Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas) s 33 ; Wrongs Act  1958 (Vic) s 72 (1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 53 (2); Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) , s 35 (1) . 
515
 See, eg, R v Dupas (2010) 211 A Crim R 81, where Hollingworth J deemed expert opinion on the 
‘misinformation effect’ admissible. This phenomenon occurs where a person unconsciously 
substitutes information they have seen on TV or newspapers for what they did in fact witness; at 83 
[11]-[12]  
516
 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595; See generally, Tim Rogers, 
‘Diagnostic Validity and Psychiatric Expert Testimony’ (2004) 27 (3) International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 281. 
517
  See, eg, Chamberlian v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521. 
518
  See, eg, Aytugrul v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157. 
519
  See R v O’ Callaghan [1976] VR 676; R v Lawless [1974] VR 398, 423 where the court noted ‘[i]t 
is a matter for expertise not possessed by the ordinary run of mankind to identify characteristics of 
fingerprints’ citied in Freckelton and Selby, above n 434, 246.  
520
  See, eg, Kalbasi v State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 241 (17 October 2013). 
521
  Edmond, ‘Specialised Knowledge’ above n 434, 46.  
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function to ensure a factually accurate verdict consistent with the goals of the 
criminal process.  
  Exclusionary approach in relation to expert eyewitness evidence 1
First, an illustration of the risk which excluding expert evidence poses to the fair trial 
can be built on the example of identification evidence. Indeed, as the Court in 
Henderson made clear, identification evidence is inherently unreliable. However, it 
also may be highly probative.  
Judicial recognition of the various memory and cognitive processes which make 
eyewitness evidence unreliable is longstanding.
522
 This apprehension is not 
unfounded. Roughly eighty per cent of all wrongful convictions in the US involve 
some form of identification evidence.
523
 As Sotomayor J of the United States 
Supreme Court emphasised, ‘[s]tudy after study demonstrates that eyewitness 
recollections are highly susceptible to distortion by postevent information or social 
cues’.524 Indeed, there are numerous variables any of which can have a profound 
impact on the reliability of this evidence.
525
  
                                                          
522
 See R v Dwyer [1925] 2 KB 799, 802-3 (Lord Hewart CJ); Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429, 
446 (Evatt and McTiernan JJ); Davies v The Queen (1937) 57 CLR 170, 181; See Heydon, above n 
73, 64-5. 
523
 See Perry v New Hapmshire 132 S.Ct 716, 738-9 (Ginsburg J) (2012); Brandon L Garrett, Judging 
Innocence (2008) 108 Colombia Law Review 55, 78. See also Andreas Kapardis, Psychology and 
Law: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2010) 25-6;  Gary L Wells and 
Elizabeth A Olson, Eyewitness Testimony (2003) 54 Annual Review of Psychology  277, 287 where 
the authors note that more than 75% of the people exonerated by DNA tests were convicted on 
erroneous eyewitness evidence;InnocenceProject,EyewitnessMisidentificationInnocenceProject 
<http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php> . 
524
  Perry v New Hampshire 132 S.Ct 716, 739 (2012).  
525
 Kapardis, above n 462, 39-54 These include; 1) Passage of time 2)Frequency of the event 3) 
Duration of the event 4)Illumination 5)Type of event 6) whether a weapon was used 7) the degree of 
violence or trauma caused 8) the type of weapon used 8) the ‘flashbulb memory’ effect (which posits 
that the shock or suddenness of the occurrence of the  event can effect memory); See especially, State 
v Henderson  27 A. 3d 872, 920-3 (NJ,2011) Other factors include the issues of cross racial 
identification R v Dodd (2002) 135 A Crim R 32. 
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In general, the veracity of such evidence at trial is not determined with assistance 
from expert scientific evidence.
526
 There are a number of reasons for this.
527
 For one, 
Australian (as well as American and Canadian) Courts have held that the 
administration of justice operates on certain assumptions, one of them being the fact 
that people are able to observe and recall things that they observe.
 528
 In other words, 
such evidence may be inadmissible by operation of the ‘common knowledge rule’.529  
Freckelton and Selby argue that because of this rule, the fragilities of eyewitness 
testimony are not commonly explained by way of expert testimony.
530
 Rather, much 
faith is often placed on traditional adversarial safeguards such as cross 
examination.
531
 Consequently, while it is open to defence counsel to adduce expert 
evidence to testify to the unreliability of eyewitness evidence; generally speaking, 
courts  adhere to the ‘basic assumption’ that people can accurately recall what they 
observe. 
532
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 See Ian Freckelton, ‘Medial Issues: eyewitness Identification law reform: the need for persistence’ 
(2013) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 503, 509. The author notes ’expert evidence on the risks of 
eyewitness identification either in the particular instance or more generally is very rarely led on behalf 
of accused persons.’; Gary Edmond et al, ‘Admissibility Compared’ above n 489, 79; Ian R Coyle, 
David Field and Glen Miller, The blindness of the eye-witness (2008) 82 Australian Law Journal 
471,474-5. 
527
 See, eg, United States v Langan 263 F 3d 613 (6
th
 Cir, 2001), 621 citied in Freckelton and Selby, 
above n 434, 710; State v Coley 32 S.W. 3d 831, 833-4 (Tenn, 2000); Lee Steusser, Experts on 
Eyewitness Identification: I Just Don’t See It (2005) 31 Manitoba Law Journal 543, 543 ‘In my view, 
admitting this type of expert evidence, with its associated costs, is not necessary to ensure a fair trial. 
Simply put, we ought to leave the educating of the jury on eyewitness identification to the trial 
process and not to the experts.’ 
528
 R v Smith [1987] VR 907, 910 (Vincent J); Ian Fraser etal, Is the Accuracy of Eyewitness 
Testimony Common Knowledge? (2013) 59 Criminal Law Quarterly 498, 504-6; See United States v 
Langan 263 F 3d 613 (6th Cir, 2001); Ian Freckelton and Selby, above n 434, 707-12. 
529
 R v Smith [1987] VR 907, 910 (Vincent J) the court relies on ‘assumptions that human beings are 
capable of observing events , of recalling what has been observed and repeating that which has been 
heard and that which has been seen’ citied in Freckelton and Selby, above n 434, 708. 
530
 Freckelton and Selby, above n 434, 703 
531
 Ibid 708-9 
532
 Ibid citing R v Smith (1990) 64 AJLR 588, 588 ( Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh 
JJ) ‘It is basic to the operation of the jury system that general questions as to the credit and reliability 
of the evidence of witnesses including the reliability of identification are, subject the special 
exemptions, matters which are within the range of human experience which must be determined by 
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The danger eyewitness testimony poses to the fair trial was expressed in Festa v The 
Queen.
533
  First, eyewitnesses are often mistaken but honest and thereby appear as a 
credible witness to the jury.
534
 As explained below, in part, the honestly of the 
witness negates the ability of fair trial safeguards to expose weaknesses in their 
evidence. Second, the very nature of this evidence, in connecting the accused to the 
crime results in a ‘tendency for identification evidence to be given special weight, 
including in the mind of a jury’.535    
This illustrates that there is a real risk of a wrongful conviction where the fallibility 
of eyewitness evidence is not brought to the attention of the jury.
536
 The central 
quandary is that eyewitness evidence is a result of an interplay between numerous 
and complex memory and cognitive processes.
537
 As a consequence, the unreliability 
of this evidence cannot be instinctively identified by a lay jury.
538
 If courts have 
recognised the fallibility of memory and perception,
539
 it is unclear why expert 
evidence which explains the accuracy of this evidence to a lay jury is not regularly 
admitted or encouraged.
540
 And if the jury system is founded on the belief that the 
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jury is able to understand the evidence,
541
 it follows that reliable expert evidence 
which highlights the weaknesses in eyewitness testimony should be admitted.
542
 
In light of this, it has been argued that there is a need for courts to be more willing to 
admit expert testimony which highlights the unreliability of eyewitness evidence.
543
 
This is imperative as the concerns in relation to eyewitness evidence are only going 
to get more complex in light of the availability of social media through which 
witness are able to ‘recognise’ alleged criminals.544 While expert evidence is not a 
cure all to the issues of misidentification, ‘it cannot be anything other than an 
improvement to the current state of affairs’.545 Further, these concerns are not limited 
to eyewitness evidence and also apply to other areas where expert testimony is 
needed to explain issues prone to misinterpretation by a jury.
546
 
 Inclusionary Approach in relation to unreliable expert testimony 2
Jeremy Bentham professed that ‘to exclude evidence is to exclude justice’.547 
However, not all expert evidence should be admitted. This was recognised by Justice 
Hand who wrote that the use of expert witnesses precedes the exclusionary rule of 
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opinion evidence. 
548
 Although as the rules of opinion evidence developed, the law of 
expert evidence remained largely untouched.
549
  
As noted above, the proper purpose for the court is to determine whether the accused 
is criminally responsible.
550
  However, unlike the United States position, in Australia, 
there is no express requirement for the underlying basis of expert testimony to be 
reliable in order to be admissible. Essentially, the danger with this is that it provides 
a channel for unreliable and prejudicial (and in some cases irrelevant)
551
 evidence to 
be brought before the court.
552
 Therefore, the admission of unreliable expert evidence 
or expert evidence the reliability of which is unknown, into court dilutes the right to 
a fair trial.
553
 The threat to the fair trial is intensified by the very nature of expert 
evidence. Justice Sophinka has expressed; 
Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and 
submitted through a witness of impressive antecedents, this evidence is apt to be 
accepted by the jury as being virtually infallible and as having more weight than it 
deserves
554
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(a) Identification evidence- facial mapping 
To extend the focus on identification evidence, other more recent forms of such 
evidence such as ‘facial mapping’ are problematic.555 Inherently, images emit an aura 
of objectivity which, as the case with eyewitness evidence, directly connects the 
accused to a crime.
556
  Although as opposed to eyewitness evidence, facial mapping 
has not as yet been subject to significant scientific examination.
557
  
Facial mapping is used to assist the jury in the determination of whether persons in 
photos or videos match the accused.
558
 This field is not one which requires 
specialised knowledge or expertise as it has no scientific basis.
559
 Accordingly, 
expert facial mapping testimony is generally inadmissible to the issue of identity.
560
 
That is; the expert cannot express a definite or direct conclusion such as, for 
example, whether ‘the two men were, indeed, the same man’.561  
Expert testimony is still able to enter the court if such experts are classed as ‘ad hoc’ 
experts.
562
 Such experts are admitted on the basis that, for instance, repeated 
exposure to a video tape enables them to identify the person in that tape.
563
 As a 
result, the testimony of the expert witness is admissible if modified so as to avoid 
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direct identification.
564
  Thus they may express their opinion as to how close samples 
compare but not definite conclusions as to their similarity.
565
  
The hazard this poses to the fair trial is that ‘facial mapping’ is a field of which the 
reliability is unknown.
566
  As Edmond et al note, where the identification is not based 
on a distinct trait (for instance a tattoo or scar) it is necessary to know the 
independence of distinct facial features among the population in order for this 
evidence to be probative.
567
 However, there is no database containing such 
information.
568
 There are also multitudes of other variables such as image quality and 
perspective which are able to significantly affect the probative value of the 
evidence.
569
 As a result, the image is often of low utility.
570
 Moreover, the 
approaches experts adopt are disparate and largely incoherent.
571
   
Despite the frailties in the science of facial mapping, generally speaking, such ad hoc 
testimony is admissible if expressed indirectly.
572
 While this has the appearance of 
fairness, the reality is that the limits of such statements are often pushed and the rule 
against expressing a conclusion does not offer much substantive protection.
573
 And 
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as with eyewitness evidence, the difficulties in this field are only going to grow in 
light of the increasing use of CCTV and other surveillance devices.
574
  
These issues are not confined to eyewitness, other identification or psychological 
evidence but extend to most forms of forensic evidence. The National Research 
Council released an authoritative analysis on the foundations of the forensic sciences 
used in trials (‘the NRC Report’).575 It was concluded that notwithstanding nuclear 
DNA analysis, there is no forensic method which has established a reliable technique 
able to match a particular sample to an individual.
576
 Such issues are compounded by 
varying standards between the numerous disciplines and sub disciplines under the 
rubric of forensic science which poses a ‘serious problem’.577 These issues are not 
confined to the United States and are alive in Australia.
578
  
Indeed, the fallibility of many forensic techniques in addition to the fact that in 
certain cases, the rules of admissibility fail to filter unreliable expert testimony has, 
arguably, allowed ‘the expert to mix fact with fantasy and reliable science with 
speculation indiscriminately and without warning, notice or distinction’.579 
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 Limited Effectiveness of Fair Trial Safeguards  E
The right to a fair trial is personified ‘in rules of law and of practise designed to 
regulate the course of the trial’.580 However, expert evidence poses specific 
challenges to the traditional adversarial safeguards of the fair trial.
581
 As a result, the 
danger to the fair trial is amplified by the limited ability of such safeguards to 
overcome the unique challenges posed by expert evidence.  
 Cross examination, rebuttal witnesses and other adversarial safeguards 1
(a) Exclusionary approach in relation to eyewitness evidence 
Australian courts often place faith in adversarial safeguards such as the rules of 
evidence, cross examination and warnings to mitigate any dangers of 
misidentification.
582
 In turn, the ability of such safeguards to expose weaknesses in 
the evidence is limited. For instance, jury directions are a consequence of the right to 
fair trial.
583
 Thus it was held that the dangers of attributing too much weight to 
eyewitness evidence must be made known to the jury though a ‘Domician’ 
warning.
584
 Such a warning, buttressed by the authority of the court,
585
 must be given 
in a manner highlighting the specific weakness of this ‘inherently fragile’586 
evidence. Nonetheless, such directions are themselves limited in their 
effectiveness.
587
 Indeed, the fact that about eighty per cent of wrongful convictions 
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stem from mistaken identification evidence testifies to the ineffectiveness of jury 
directions.
588
 While the court retains the discretion to exclude evidence which is 
more prejudicial than probative,
589
 this warning remains the principal safeguard in 
light of the fact that the judge must first warn him or herself in determining the 
admissibility of the evidence.
590
   
Another fair trial safeguard is the right to cross examine.
591
  Cross- examination has 
been described as ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the 
truth’592. However, its capacity to highlight weaknesses in eyewitness testimony is 
limited. Although dissenting in Perry, this point was forcefully made by 
Sotomayor  J. Her Honour noted the ‘corrosive effects of suggestion’593 which may 
be unintentional, on the ultimate reliability of the evidence.
594
 Indeed, it is often the 
case that eyewitnesses hold honest but mistaken beliefs as to the accuracy of their 
evidence limiting the ability of safeguards such as cross examination to determine its 
accuracy.
595
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In one study, it was found that simulated jurors were mostly unaware of possible bias 
in circumstances where they are told that the accused is part of the line-up.
596
 Such 
jurors were also not aware of possible bias where the line-up was conducted 
sequentially as opposed to simultaneously.
597
 In other study, jurors in a simulated 
trial it were unresponsive to a number of factors which were established to be facts 
which affect the reliability of the eyewitness evidence.
598
 Rather, the jury was 
influenced by the confidence of the witness.
599
  The hazard with this is that ‘studies 
conducted as early as 1895 have consistently shown that confidence is not, in fact 
necessarily an indication of accuracy’.600 
The inability of safeguards such as cross examination and jury directions to expose 
weaknesses in the testimony of witnesses who have an honest but false belief in their 
evidence effectively dilutes the ability of the accused to examine the witnesses of the 
prosecution.
601
 This strikes at the heart of the fair trial. 
(b) Inclusionary approach in relation to other incriminating expert testimony 
Similarly, traditional adversarial safeguards such as cross examination and rebuttal 
experts are generally ill equipped to deal with expert testimony which is unreliable or 
of unknown reliability.
602
 For instance, following an analysis of the relevant 
empirical literature, it was concluded that cross examination has ‘little or no ability’ 
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to determine the veracity of expert testimony.
603
 This holds even in the case where 
the expert’s examination in chief ‘is fraught with weaknesses and the cross is well 
designed to expose those weaknesses’.604 This is on top of the tendency of defence 
counsel to focus on procedural issues as opposed to the underlying reliability of the 
scientific evidence.
605
 
The criminal trial is of course adversarial and it is always open to each party to call 
rebuttal witnesses or evidence.
606
 Accordingly, while it is open to defence counsel to 
lead rebuttal witnesses, in practise this does not equate to fairness. The most apparent 
problem is the vast disparity between the resources available to the state and that of 
the defendant.
607
  Thus in areas like latent fingerprint analysis,
608
 the state often has 
sole access to organised experts with the necessary facilities.
609
  These issues aside, 
there have been a number of studies which question the effect of rebuttal witnesses. 
It has been suggested that the presence of a rebuttal expert, ‘does not effectively 
counter the testimony offered by the initial expert’.610 Also, among other things, 
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rebuttal experts may be ineffective in educating jurors on the strength of the 
scientific evidence.
611
  
Yet another issue is that in the absence of research accurately determining the 
reliability of many forensic techniques, the expert witness may present their evidence 
in a manner that amplifies its actual reliability.
612
 Indeed, this issue has been 
highlighted in a number of reports in relation to latent fingerprint analysis.
613
  
Essentially, as Professor Edmond notes, ‘facilitating cross-examination or allowing 
the defence to call rebuttal expertise does not make the trial fair. Structural symmetry 
is not the same as substantial fairness’.614  
 Right to a Fair Trial- The admissibility of expert evidence and the goals of F
the criminal process 
It has been explained above that the criminal trial has both a rights protecting and 
truth seeking function.
615
 In other words, the right to a fair trial involves both 
protecting the rights of all actors in the trial process and, fundamentally, producing 
an accurate verdict.  
In relation to the protection of rights, the accused right to a fair trial is not 
absolute.
616
 Sometimes, considerations of public policy will outweigh the right of an 
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accused to an independent and impartial tribunal. This is evident in Dupas.
617
  
Neither are other elements of the fair trial such as the privilege against self-
incrimination absolute.
618
 As seen in Momcilovic, this is the case even where those 
rights are embodied in human rights instruments.
619
 Arguably, the fact that the rights 
of the accused yield to other interests in some cases is consistent with the fair trial as 
it is a right which all parties share equally.
620
  
However, the danger in relation to the reception of expert evidence which is 
unreliable or of unknown reliability is that it increases the likelihood of miscarriages 
of justice.
621
  In this vein, it is useful to reiterate that the NAS Report made explicit 
the need for more research to determine the reliability of such crucial forensic 
sciences such as; tool mark and firearms evidence,
622
 hair and fibre analysis,
623
 
questioned document examination,
624
  bite mark evidence,
625
 and blood stain pattern 
evidence.
626
 Similarly, in the case of eyewitness identification, evidence which is 
reliable and able to better explain the weaknesses in the evidence to the finder of fact 
should be more readily admissible. This is significant as eighty per cent of all 
wrongful convictions involve some form of eyewitness testimony.  
                                                          
617
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The forgoing analysis highlights that if the fair trial necessitates an accurate verdict, 
there are essentially two ways of dealing with unreliable evidence. The first is to 
exclude such evidence.
627
 Second, such evidence may be admitted but its weaknesses 
must be highlighted to the finder of fact.
628
 The problem with the latter approach is 
that fair trial safeguards cannot always ensure that the jury is made fully aware of the 
fallibilities of such evidence. Accordingly, if the criminal trial pursues the goal of a 
factually accurate verdict, expert evidence which is unreliable or of unknown 
reliability should not be admitted.
629
 Equally, where expert evidence exists to explain 
the inherent unreliability of evidence to the finder of fact, it is important that such 
evidence be admitted so as to avoid miscarriages of justice.  
 Conclusions G
It is recognised that a balance must be struck between the allocation of limited 
resources and the right of the accused to a factually accurate verdict.
630
 In any case 
however, the state retains the obligation to adopt procedures most likely to result in 
an accurate outcome.
631
 This is because all parties have a right to a factually accurate 
verdict.
632
  
The exclusion of unreliable expert evidence will serve to further the rational 
objectives of the criminal trial which is factual accuracy in the verdict.
633
 Equally, 
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(2002) 218 DLR (4
th) 385, 427 (L’Hereux-Dube J) ‘One cannot over- emphasize the commitment of 
courts of justice to the ascertainment of the truth. The just determination of guilt or innocence is a 
fundamental underpinnings of the administration of criminal justice’ citied in Gans and Palmer, above 
n 627, 9; Berger v United States 295 US 78,88 (1935). 
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[59] (Heydon J);’ Finally and very importantly, there is increasing concern about the risk of injustice 
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the reception of reliable expert testimony to accurately explain the weaknesses of the 
evidence to the jury would also further these objectives. This promotes the right to a 
fair trial for all persons, the legitimacy of the verdict and confidence in the 
administration of justice.  
Fair trial principles are safeguarded by a framework of laws and practices which are 
able to adapt to changing circumstances.
634
 It therefore follows that continued 
significance of the right to a fair trial depends on the ability of criminal procedure to 
develop a principled approach which reflects its underlying purpose in light of 
scientific developments. As Edmond and Roberts have expressed;    
a serious commitment to the idea of a fair trial requires us to develop rules are procedures 
that accommodate empirical revelations concerning the tendencies and capacities of the 
actors in the trial process
635
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Ligertwood and Edmond, Australian Evidence, above n 205, 630. But see South Australian 
Legislative Review Committee, Parliament of South Australia, Inquiry into Criminal Cases Review 
Commission Bill (2012)  31. 
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VI  THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA- CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS 
The right to a fair trial is fundamental to the administration of justice. It is entrenched 
in numerous international human rights instruments and, in Australia, remains a key 
common law right. As Issacs J wrote, ‘[i]t is a right which inheres in every system of 
law that makes any pretension to civilisation’.636 His Honour went on to note that the 
right to a fair trial ‘would be an empty thing, unless the law adequately protected 
it’.637 
The reason why the right to a fair trial necessitates protection stems from the right of 
all persons to fair and equal treatment.
638
 This promotes the ‘moral authority’ of the 
verdict and fosters public confidence in the administration of justice.
639
 
While the common law protects the right in various ways, the right to a fair trial 
remains vulnerable to legislative inroads. The principle of legality may not 
adequately protect the fair trial given it is limited by its binary application. Even in 
X7, where the Court upheld the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a fair 
trial played a limited role. The majority did not base their decision on the fairness of 
the trial as it was too abstract to be applied. Thereafter, in Lee, the right to silence 
was found to be limited by the words of the CAR Act. The right to a fair trial did not 
offer the appellants a remedy to the express words in the Act. Indeed, as Momcilovic 
made clear, the court cannot depart from the meaning of the statute even if there is a 
statutory requirement to interpret legislation in light of human rights.
640
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In this regard, the Charter and the HRA have not substantially added to the 
protections already available at common law. The central issue is that it is difficult to 
import a UK- style remedial approach to the interpretation of legislation in light of 
the particular federal structure entrenched in the Constitution.  
In turn the Constitution does not fully entrench the right to a fair trial. The implied 
doctrine of separation of powers and its extension in Kable have embedded the 
concept of an independent and impartial judiciary which, as explained above, is the 
core of the right to a fair trial. Aside from this core however, key fair trial rights are 
not constitutionally protected in their fullest sense. 
The right to a fair trial extends throughout the criminal process, is ever changing in 
scope and content and also requires a balance between competing considerations. 
The broad scope of the right requires consideration of a range of interests, including 
and especially, the logistics of the criminal justice system.
641
 And in this sense the 
legislature is in a better position than the courts to determine how such a balance 
should be struck.
642
 Primary, this is because courts cannot conduct an exhaustive 
inquiry, beyond the scope of the trial, to consider all the competing interests 
involved.
643
 Nonetheless, the role of the court in the continued significance of the fair 
trial is ‘to stand firm against clear injustice to specific individuals’.644  
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Fundamentally, the right to a fair trial requires an accurate verdict. As explained, this 
is an outcome which is fair to all parties, promotes the legitimacy of the verdict and 
the administration of justice. In this regard, expert evidence which is probative and 
able to better explain the inherent weaknesses of the evidence to the finder of fact 
should be more readily admissible. Equally, the accuracy of the verdict demands 
increased scrutiny of expert opinion evidence which is unreliable or of unknown 
reliability.  However, due to a number of legal and institutional reasons, the court 
may not be the most appropriate venue to determine the reliability of forensic expert 
opinion.
645
 It is therefore, incumbent upon legislatures to critically assess and 
implement the appropriate strategies to direct the law to achieve accuracy in the 
verdict and to do so fairly. 
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